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D AVID Davis is not included in the Atlantic Monthly's inventory 
of the
one hundred most influential Americans. Nor has "big Judge Davis"'
made any list of great Supreme Court Justices.' His anonymity also makes
it unlikely that he will join the Supreme Court Justice bobble-head
collection created by The Green Bag.' These slights are not surprising. But
it is somewhat disheartening that Judge Davis's solid resume did not merit
his inclusion in a recent symposium on neglected Supreme Court Justices.'
After all, how many judges can boast that they authored a Supreme
Court opinion described as "one of the bulwarks of American liberty,"'
masterminded Abraham Lincoln's presidential nomination in 1860,8 and
I Circuit Judge (retired), Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, Lake County, Illinois. Judge
McKoski is an Adjunct Professor of Law at The John Marshall Law School, Chicago, Illinois.
In the interest of full disclosure, the author is the Vice-Chair of the Illinois Judicial Ethics
Committee and a member of the American Bar Association and American Judicature Society.
The views expressed in this Article are solely those of the author.
2 Ross Douthat, They Made America, THE ATLANTIc, Dec. 2oo6, at 59, available at http://
www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archivC/2006/I2/the-top-00/5384 (listing the one hundred
most influential figures in American history as ranked by a panel of respected historians).
3 According to Abraham Lincoln, David Davis was referred to as "big Judge Davis" in or-
der to distinguish him from another Illinois judge, Oliver L. Davis, otherwise known as "little
Judge Davis." WILLARD L. KING, LINCOLN'S MANAGER: DAvID DAvis 152 (1960). The moniker
ostensibly had nothing to do with David Davis's 3oo-pound frame.
4 See, e.g., ALBERT P. BLAUSTEIN & Roy M. MERSKY, 'ME FIRST ONE HUNDRED JUSTICES:
STATISTICAL STUDIES ON THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 39 (1978) (ranking Davis
as an average Supreme Court Justice).
5 Green Bag Bobbleheads, THE GREEN BAG, http://www.greenbag.orgfbobbleheads/
bobbleheads.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2010).
6 See James W. Ely, Jr. & Mark E. Brandon, The Rankings Game, 62 VAND. L. REV. 311
(2009). The organizers of the symposium acknowledged that many worthy candidates for ne-
glected justice status did not make the symposium cut. Id. at 316.
7 2 CHARLES WARREN, ThE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 149 (Beard Books
1999) (describing the opinion authored by Justice Davis in Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.)
2 (1866)); see infra Part I.B.5 (discussing the decision in Exparte Milligan).




served as de facto Vice President of the United States?9
Except for the usual obligatory reference in works about Abraham
Lincoln, the accomplishments of Judge Davis are overlooked and
undervalued. 0 This inattention may be due to Davis's un-glamorous work
as a transactional and collections lawyer and his low-profile service as a
circuit-riding trial judge prior to his appointment to the Supreme Court.
Perhaps the routine nature of most legal work in the nineteenth century
limited the judge's chance for greatness." Or it just may be that all of
Lincoln's associates are doomed to be judged by their usefulness to the
greatest President rather than on their individual achievements."
But the neglect of the judicial career of David Davis is most likely
due to the fact that he simply has no legitimate claim to be remembered
for scholarship, contributions to constitutional theory," or other tangible,
resume-filling achievements valued by legal scholars. Nonetheless, Davis
did make a substantial contribution to the legal system. His vital, albeit
invisible, contribution was to the intangible fabric of the system itself.
During his judicial service he consistently exhibited the quality most
essential to maintaining the legitimacy of the judiciary: actual impartiality in
the exercise of judicial duties.14 The public recognized Davis's impartiality
9 See infra Part I.B.6 (discussing Davis's service as president of the United States
Senate).
to ButseeWilliam D. Bader & Frank J. Williams, DavidDavis:Lawyer Judge, and Politician
in the Age of Lincoln, 14 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 163, 213 (2009) (concluding that Davis
"embodied the unmistakable qualities that comprise a good judge").
II Donald Grier Stephenson, Jr., The Waite Court at the Bar of History, 81 DENv. U. L.
REV. 449,451 (2003) (suggesting that some members of Chief Justice Waite's court, including
David Davis, may not have received due acclaim because of the "routine nature of much of
nineteenth century judicial business" (citation omitted)).
12 See JAMEs GRAY, THE ILLINOIS 181 (1940) ("For the rest of his life [Davis] was to walk
in the shadow of the man he had helped to make."); Bader & Williams, supra note to, at 165
("Perhaps, also, Davis ironically is eclipsed in reputation by his very close proximity to our
mostly highly esteemed American, Abraham Lincoln.").
13 The "war on terror" and trials of "'enemy combatants"' by military commissions have
rekindled scholarly interest in Justice Davis's most significant opinion, Ex parte Milligan, 71
U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (I866). See, e.g., Kyndra Rotunda, A Comparative HistoricalAnalysis of War Time
Procedural Protections and Presidential Powers: From the Civil War to the War on Terror, 12 CHAP. L.
REV. 449,462-64 (2oog); see also infra Part I.B.5 (discussing the Milligan decision).
14 As used in this Article, the terms "impartial" and "impartiality" denote a lack
of partiality along many dimensions including (s) an "absence of bias or prejudice" for or
against parties or their attorneys; (2) decisions unaffected by improper influences such as
public clamor, executive and legislative branch pressures, personal preferences, friendship,
and loyalties; and (3) open-mindedness. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT terminology
(2007); Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 775-80 (zoo2). This definition
includes what is often referred to as "judicial independence." See also James E. Moliterno,
The Administrative Judiciary's Independence Myth, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV I191, 1200 (2oo6)
(describing independence as "a subset of impartiality, isolating only those influences that
come from the electorate, the political process, or the other branches of government"); Robert
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even though his off-bench life did not foster the appearance of impartiality.
His close and longstanding personal and political loyalties could easily
have led to the public perception that Davis's alliances would influence
his courtroom decisions. But they did not. His fairness was universally
recognized notwithstanding the "appearance" that his judicial rulings
would be shaped by considerations other than the facts and the law.
In Davis's time, the legitimacy of the judicial system was measured by
the degree of impartiality demonstrated by judicial officers in court and
not upon secondary cues taken from a judge's personal life. To the extent
that the appearance of impartiality was important, it existed as a natural
byproduct of actual impartiality.
Regrettably, the American Bar Association (ABA) Canons of Judicial
Ethics ("1924 Canons")" shifted the emphasis away from reality and
toward perception in the effort to sustain judicial legitimacy. The 1924
Canons, and each succeeding version of the ABA Model Code of Judicial
Conduct, endeavored first and foremost to promote an "appearance" of
judicial impartiality." The ABA Model Codes were designed to regulate
every aspect of a judge's off-bench life in order to avoid the possibility that
a judge's personal, social, business, political, philosophical, or economic
interests could in any way be perceived by the public as influencing judicial
decisions. Under these modern rules of judicial conduct, perpetuating
the image of the impartial judge has become the primary vehicle for
sustaining judicial legitimacy. In the world of appearance-based ethics,
efforts to promote actual impartiality have receded into the background as
a secondary concern.
Relying on ill-defined, shifting perceptions drawn from a judge's political
affiliation, charitable fund-raising activities, fraternal club memberships,
or other extrajudicial activities is an ineffective and eventually doomed
method of safeguarding public faith in the judicial branch. David Davis
teaches that the legal profession must re-emphasize what has traditionally
sustained public trust in the courts-actual judicial impartiality. If that can
be accomplished, then the appearances will take care of themselves.
The thesis of this Article is taken straight from the life of Judge Davis.
Public trust and confidence in the judiciary is best maintained by the
exhibition of judicial fairness and impartiality in the courtroom. Simply put,
actual impartiality is more important than the appearance of impartiality.
Therefore, the judicial ethics community should concentrate its efforts
on developing programs, rules, and procedures that enhance judicial
G. Natelson, A Reminder: The Constitutional Values of Sympathy and Independence, 91 Ky. L.J. 353,
384 (2003) (observing that only independent people can use their intelligence to impartially
solve problems).
15 CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETmIcs (1924).
16 See infra Part II.B.i-5 (tracing the development of the appearance of impropriety
standards in the four ABA Model Judicial Codes).
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impartiality and thereby the legitimacy of the third branch. Developing and
enforcing rules restricting off-bench activities because the activities might
appear to some as inconsistent with judicial impartiality is less important
and should be treated accordingly.
This Article proceeds in three Parts. First, if Judge Davis is to serve as
an example of how actual impartiality promotes public confidence in the
judiciary, even in the face of partisan appearances, it must be demonstrated
that (1) Davis's conduct off the bench created an appearance that his
private relationships, loyalties, and interests would infect his judicial
decisions, and (2) despite such appearances, Davis maintained a reputation
for impartiality throughout his judicial career. Part I undertakes this task
by describing Davis's personal, professional, and political associations and
allegiances, with particular focus on his special relationship with Lincoln
the lawyer, candidate, and president. Part I then details the high esteem in
which Davis was held by the nineteenth-century legal and lay communities
notwithstanding the appearance of partiality created by his off-bench
relationships and activities. Finally, Part I evaluates the personal, social,
and political activities of Judge Davis through the lens of modern day,
appearance-based rules of judicial ethics.
Part II discusses the transition from actual impartiality as the measure
of judicial performance in Davis's time to the current overriding concern
with protecting the appearance of fairness. The origin and development of
a judge's duty to avoid the appearance of impropriety in all personal and
professional endeavors is traced through each version of the ABA Model
Judicial Code, including the current ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct
("2007 Code").
Part III suggests strategies by which actual impartiality can regain its
rightful status as the most important value in judicial ethics. First, it is
proposed that the legal profession recognize and formally acknowledge
that impartiality in fact is more important than impartiality in appearance.
Just as corporations use branding to reinforce public confidence in their
commercial products, the court system needs to "brand" the concept of
impartiality into its public identity. Second, judicial disciplinary bodies
should be required to impose an increased level of punishment for infractions
that demonstrate favoritism, prejudice, or other form of judicial partiality.
Third, judicial education must include instruction about cognitive illusions,
biases, and other faulty mental processes that subconsciously interfere with
truly impartial decision-making. Fourth, impartiality must be expressly
acknowledged as the primary criterion in the selection and evaluation of
judges. The modest, non-controversial proposals outlined in Part III will
reaffirm the irreplaceable cultural norm of the neutral magistrate."
17 More complex, controversial, and costly recommendations for improving the fair-
ness of the justice system abound. Some recommendations focus on improving the appear-
ance of impartiality while others seek to improve actual impartiality. Unsurprisingly, numer-
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I. DAVID DAVIS: ON AND OFF THE BENCH
David Davis served as a circuit-riding trial judge in central Illinois from
1848 until 1862.18 During that time he developed and maintained a close
association with lawyers, witnesses, and litigants. He had little choice. He
worked, ate, slept, and socialized with the attorneys, parties, jurors, and
witnesses who appeared before him." Personally, the judge preferred
certain lawyers over others and spent countless hours promoting his favorite
lawyer and candidate, Abraham Lincoln.20 The friendships, loyalties, and
alliances developed by the judge would make today's judicial ethicists
shutter. Disqualification or impeachment would be demanded based on
the "appearance" of partiality created by the off-bench activities of Judge
Davis. But even in light of all his extrajudicial entanglements Davis held
the reputation, both as a member of the circuit bench and Supreme Court,
as a fair and impartial judge. That is because, appearances aside, he was a
fair and impartial judge.
A. Life on the Circuit
For six months each year, Judge Davis and his small troupe of lawyers
traversed the Eighth Judicial Circuit of Illinois holding court in one county
ous proposals urge the elimination or restructuring of judicial elections. See, e.g., OHIO CODE
OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 4 .4 (J) & (K) (2009) (establishing caps on contributions to judicial
campaigns); Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Elections Stink, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 43, 72-79
(2003) (suggesting the elimination of judicial elections); Maura Anne Schoshinski, Note and
Comment, Towards an Independent, Fair, and Competent Judiciary: An Argument for Improving
Judicial Elections, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 839, 858-59 (1994) (recommending full disclosure
of campaign contributions and the creation of election monitors); David K. Stott, Comment,
Zero-Sum Judicial Elections: Balancing Free Speech and Impartiality Through Recusal Reform,
2oo9 BYU L. REV. 481, 509-10 (proposing that judicial candidates make copies of campaign
speeches, ads, and materials available for public inspection); Bryce Farbstein, Public Financing
for Judicial Integrity, ATLANTA J. CONST., Aug. 16, 2oo9, at Az I (supporting "a system of public
funding for qualified judicial campaigns"). Many proposals significantly expand judicial dis-
qualification rules. See, e.g., JAMES SAMPLE ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, FAIR COURTS:
SETTING RECUSAL STANDARDS 25-35 (2oo8), available at http://brennan.3cdn.netlhafco474a
5a5 3 df4 do_7tm6brjhd.pdf; Stott, supra, at 5o9-To. One controversial plan to improve actual
impartiality suggests the elimination of non-attorney judges. See Cathy Lesser Mansfield,
Disorder in the People's Court: Rethinking the Role ofNon-Lawyer Judges in Limited Jurisdiction Court
Civil Cases, 29 N.M. L. REV. 119, 133-34 (i999); see also William Glaberson, Overhaul of New
York's Small-Town Courts Looks Unlikely, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 201o, at AI8 (reporting the debate
between proponents and opponents of the effort to abolish non-lawyer judges in New York).
18 Stanley I. Kutler, DAviD DAVIS, in 2 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT 1789-1969: THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS 520, 521 (Leon Friedman & Fred L.
Israel eds., 1997).
19 See infra Part l.A.
2o FREDERICK TREVOR HILL, LINCOLN THE LAWYER 183 (1906) (describing Lincoln as
Davis's favorite circuit lawyer).
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seat after another.' Davis was personally acquainted with a large number
of the residents in the circuit and was friendly with many of the litigants
and jurors." Meals were usually taken at one table by the judge, lawyers,
parties, jurors, witnesses, prisoners, and sometimes the general public."
After dinner, the attorneys invited by Davis would adjourn to his room for
storytelling, political talk, and mock trials.24 According to an attorney who
joined the circuit in 1854, on one occasion a defendant on trial for perjury
spent evenings with the lawyers in the judge's room, and on another
occasion a defendant "took walks with [Davis and the attorneys] and ate in
[their] immediate company."26 Because the opening of court was a highlight
of the social calendar in many towns," some evenings the traveling group
returned to the courtroom joined by witnesses and townspeople to listen
to Lincoln's stories." The fraternity-type association between the circuit-
riding lawyers and Judge Davis was very close and personal. As Davis
stated, "[it was impossible for a body of intelligent gentlemen to associate
together, day by day, for six months of the year, without becoming attached
to each other, and without mutual benefit."
Out of this intimate contact grew a partiality for the abilities and
personalities of certain lawyers. And consistent with his personality, the
judge took "no pains to conceal his feelings toward the different members
of the bar."3 0 For example, Davis excluded lawyers he disliked from the
"privileged clique" permitted to attend the nightly gatherings in his room.'
21 When Davis assumed his circuit-riding duties in March 1848, the Eighth Judicial
Circuit consisted of fourteen counties in central Illinois. 1849 Ill. Laws 6o (listing the coun-
ties as Sangamon, Tazwell, Woodford, McLean, Logan, DeWitt, Piart, Champaign, Vermilion,
Edgar, Shelby, Moultrie, Macon, and Christian). As the population grew, the size of the circuit
shrank. By 1861, only three counties remained in the Eighth Circuit. 1861 Ill. Laws loo (list-
ing the counties as DeWitt, Logan, and McLean).
22 HILL, supra note 20 at 181-82 ("Almost every man, woman, and child in the fourteen
counties of his circuit knew Judge Davis.").
23 HENRY CLAY WHITNEY, LIFE ON THE CIRCUIT WITH LINCOLN 63, 72 (1940).
24 Id. at 66-67.
25 Id. at 72.
26 Id.
27 David Davis, Memorial Address: The Life and Services of John Todd Stuart (Jan.
12-13, 1886), in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ILLINOIS STATE BAR ASSOCIATION AT ITS NINTH ANNUAL
MEETING app. 47, 49-50 ("Court days were gala-days with the people, and were looked for-
ward to with ever recurring interest.... The weeks of Court were events of the year to the
people, who generally attended whether they had business or not."); Harry Edward Pratt,
Judge David Davis, 185-886, in 'IkANSACTIONS OF THE ILLINOIS STATE HISTORICAL SOCIETY
157, 164 (1930) ("To go to court and listen to the witnesses and lawyers was among the chief
amusements of the frontier settlements.").
28 I MICHAEL BURLINGAME, ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A LIFE 328 (2oo8).
29 Davis, supra note 27, at 49.
30 HILL, supro note 2o, at 183.
31 Id. ("Lincoln was the prime favorite of the privileged clique which made the judge's
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He scolded others in court." Favored lawyers, including Lincoln, were
retained to handle Davis's personal legal affairs even though they regularly
appeared before the judge in other matters." The judge's special affinity
for his "favorite" is further demonstrated by the fact that Davis appointed
Lincoln to take the bench when Davis's business or other commitments
prevented his attendance at court. 4 In an unusual move even for the time,
Davis vouched for the reasonableness of a bill for legal services that Lincoln
sent to the Illinois Central Railroad. The billing statement contained the
judge's endorsement that Lincoln rendered the services claimed and that
the fee for the services was "very reasonable."3 ' Lincoln reciprocated
by vouching for Davis. After the Chicago Daily Tribune published a letter
attacking Davis for working to undermine a Republican congressional
candidate and having "no more sympathy with the vitalizing principle of
the Republican party than an Egyptian mummy,"3 6 Lincoln wrote a long
letter to the newspaper in defense of the judge.37 Davis was very grateful
for Lincoln's intervention and testimonial." Because of their friendship,
room its headquarters."); WHITNEY, supra note 23, at 66 (describing how some lawyers were
"frozen out" of the nightly meetings by the judge).
32 See, e.g., KING, supra note 3, at 83 ("On the third occasion [upon which attorney Linder
appeared in court drunk], the Judge admonished him: 'Mr. Linder, I must give you some
advice. You must drink less and work more, or you will roll in the gutter.' Linder, outraged ..
. responded: 'And I must give your Honor some advice. You must eat less and [in the flattest
term] eliminate more or you will bust."' (alteration in original) (citation omitted)).
33 See id. at 94-95 (describing matters in which Lincoln was retained by Judge Davis);
WHITNEY, supra note 23, at 8I-82 (stating that Davis employed Henry Clay Whitney to bring
collection actions on the judge's behalf).
34 See KING, supra note 3, at 95; Bader & Williams, supra note lo, at 176 ("On at least 321
occasions, Judge Davis gave Lincoln the ultimate honor he could bestow by appointing him
a substitute judge." (citation omitted)); David Davis (1815-1886), MR. LINCOLN AND FRIENDS,
http://www.mrlincolnandfriends.org/inside.asp?pagelD=40&subjectlD=3 (last visited Oct. 7,
2010) ("Their relationship was sufficiently close that Mr. Lincoln sometimes replaced Judge
Davis on the bench when illness or personal business kept him away."). Lincoln was not
the only lawyer who substituted for Davis. KING, supra note 3, at 98 ("During 1861, several
lawyers sat for Judge Davis at various times. His favorite substitute had gone to Washington."
(citation omitted)).
35 Letter from Abraham Lincoln to James F. Joy (Sept. 14, 1855), in 2 ThE COLLECTED
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 325 & n.I (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953) [hereinafter COLLECTED
WORKS]; see also KING, supra note 3, at 9o.
36 Letter to the Editor, Opposition to Lovejoy, CHI. DAILY TRIB., June 4, 1858, at 2 ("Judge
D. [Davis] is a very fair man in his way, but has no more sympathy with the vitalizing principle
of the Republican party than an Egyptian mummy.").
37 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 35, at 31-32 (Supp. 1974). Lincoln's letter appeared
in the June I I, 1858 issue of the Chicago Daily Tribune signed "A Republican." Letter to the
Editor, Judge Davis'Position, Cm. DAILY TRiB., June I I, 1858, at 2. For a detailed review of the
circumstances surrounding the letter attacking Davis and Lincoln's response, see KING, supra
note 3, at 117-120.
38 KING, supra note 3, at 120.
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Lincoln kept no secrets from Davis," including the fact that he and Mary
were hoping for a girl when son Tad was born." Davis and Lincoln were
close friends and confidants41 and, in the opinion of some historians, Davis
was probably Lincoln's best friend. 42
1. Life on the Circuit Viewed Through the Lens of Modern-Day Judicial Ethics.-
The after-hours preferential treatment certain lawyers received from Davis
could easily create the appearance that the judge would favor those lawyers
in court. It is difficult to deny that a lawyer who was "frozen out" 43 of the
nightly soirees might appear to be at a disadvantage in court when opposed
by one of Davis's favorites who had the judge's ear at the private gatherings.
Similarly, the public could reasonably fear that a judge might favor a lawyer
personally retained by the judge, or appointed by the judge to preside in
court, or who authored a letter in defense of the judge's political activities.
The complaining witness in a criminal case might question the objectivity
of a judge who dined or took an evening walk with a defendant.
Today, similar associations and relationships would be deemed to
inescapably tarnish the public's perception of a judge's impartiality. For
example, under modern rules, a judge sitting at a lunch table with a lawyer
currently on trial before the judge creates an unacceptable appearance of
impropriety even if the seat is the only one left in the cafeteria and no
discussion of the case takes place." Indeed, any social contact between
a judge and litigants, witnesses, jurors, or attorneys during the course of
39 DAVID HERBERT DONALD, LINCOLN 242 (1995).
40 DORIS KEARNS GOODWIN, TEAM OF RIVALS: TEE POLITICAL GENIUS OF ABRAHAM
LINCOLN 152 (2005).
41 See Letter from Abraham Lincoln to James F. Babcock (Apr. 14, 186o), in 4 COLLECTED
WORKS, supra note 35, at 43 (characterizing Davis as one of Lincoln's "confidential friends");
Letter from Abraham Lincoln to Simon Cameron (Aug. 6, 186o), in 4 COLLECTED WORKS,
supra note 35, at 90-9i (referring to Davis as "my [Lincoln's] very good friend"); Letter from
Abraham Lincoln to Joseph Holt (Nov. 12, 1861), in 5 COLLECTED WORKS, supra note 35, at 21-
22 ("You have with you my good friend Judge David Davis; and allow [me] to assure you, you
were never associated with a better man." (alteration in original)); WARD H. LAMON, TEE LIFE
OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN: FROM His BIRTH To His INAUGURATION AS PRESIDENT 312 (Bison Books
1999) (1872) ("[Ilt was well understood that no man enjoyed more confidential relations with
[Lincoln] than Judge Davis."); BURLINGAME, supra note 28, at 331 (referring to Davis as one
of Lincoln's few close friends); GOODWIN, supra note 40, at 150 ("The evolution of a warm
and intimate friendship with Lincoln is evident in the judge's letters home."); Kutler, supra
note 18, at 520 (noting Davis's "close friendship and alliance with Abraham Lincoln"); HILL,
supra note 20, at 175 (describing Joshua Speed and Davis as "intimate friends" of Lincoln).
But see DONALD, supra note 39, at 146 (1995) ("Davis and Lincoln did not become intimate
friends.").
42 Leonard M. Nichoff, David Davis, in THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: ILLUSTRATED
BIOGRAPHIES 1789-1995, at 181, 184 (Clare Cushman ed., 2d ed. 1995) [hereinafter Niehoff,
ILLUSTRATED BIOGRAPHIES].
43 WHITNEY, supra note 23, at 66.
44 See Wells v. Del Norte Sch. Disc. C-7, 753 P.2d 770, 772 (Colo. App. 1987).
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a court proceeding is discouraged and considered improper.45 An equally
strict prohibition against business relationships bars a judge from hearing
cases involving an attorney who simultaneously represents the judge in a
private matter.46 An endorsement of an attorney's billing statement would
violate a multitude of present-day conduct rules.4 1
But in the face of all these suspicious appearances, Davis was able to
earn and maintain his reputation as "the most trusted jurist" in antebellum
Illinois48 simply by separating his personal preferences and off-bench
relationships from his official duties. He was an impartial judge deciding
cases on facts, not favoritism. As demonstrated in the next Section, lawyers
and the public saw past appearances and recognized Davis's actual
courtroom fairness. Actual impartiality, not appearances, sustained the
legitimacy of the judicial branch in the nineteenth century.
2. The AcknowledgedImpartiality of Circuit Judge DavidDavis.-According to a
newspaper report commenting on the judicial performance of Judge Davis
45 Ark. Judicial Discipline & Disability Comm'n v. Proctor, No. o9-738, 201o WL 271343
(Ark. Jan. 25, zoo) ("Certainly, a judge's eating lunch, in or out of his office, with defen-
dants within his jurisdiction would create in reasonable minds the perception that that judge's
ability to carry out his judicial responsibilities with integrity, impartiality, and competence is
impaired."); Demoulas v. Demoulas Super Mkts., Inc., 703 N.E.zd 1141, 1147 (Mass. 1998)
(finding that even "limited social contact between a judge and a lawyer appearing before [the
judge] is to be discouraged"); id. at 1147 n.Io (finding that social contact between the judge
and litigants during the course of a trial is "disfavored and should not occur"); Oliver v. State,
907 S.W2d 7o6, 713-14 (Ark. 1995) (describing alleged contact between the judge and jurors
at a restaurant as "highly improper"); Leslie W. Abramson, Appearance of Impropnerty: Deciding
When a Judge's Impartiality "Might Reasonably Be Questioned," 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 55, 96
(2000) ("Social contact by the judge with a party or victim in a pending case can lead to claims
of the appearance of partiality.").
46 Illinois Judicial Ethics Comm., Op. 95-2 (1995), available at http://ija.org/ethicsop/
opinions/95-2.htm (finding that a judge's impartiality may reasonably be questioned when
an attorney representing the judge in a private matter appears before the judge in an unre-
lated case). See generally Cynthia Gray, Disqualification: Judge's Attorney Appears in a Case, JUD.
CONDUCT REP., Fall 2002, at I, I ("Most judicial ethics committees that have addressed the
issue have advised that a judge is disqualified from a case if one of the attorneys is also repre-
senting the judge either in personal matters, including litigation and discipline proceedings,
or in lawsuits in which the judge is involved in an official capacity.").
47 E.g., MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2007) (providing that a judge "shall
avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety"); id. R. 1.3 ("A judge shall not abuse
the prestige of judicial office to advance the personal or economic interests of the judge or
others, or allow others to do so."); id. R. 2.4(C) ("A judge shall not convey or permit others to
convey the impression that any person or organization is in a position to influence the judge.");
id. R. 3.1(C) (prohibiting participation "in activities that would appear to a reasonable person
to undermine the judge's independence, integrity, or impartiality"); id. R. 3.i(D) (prohibiting
conduct "that would appear to a reasonable person to be coercive").
48 George Hope, The Great Independent: Ex- Vice President David Davis Career and Character
BROOKLYN DAILY EAGLE, May I6, 1886, at 1o (referring to Davis as the most "eminent" judge
in the Northwest before the Civil War).
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in Danville, Illinois, in 1850, "he was impartial in his decisions, firm in his
integrity, had the confidence of the profession, and was deservedly popular
with the masses." 49 A Joliet newspaper printed a resolution of the local
bar thanking Judge Davis for his "just decisions" and the "able, efficient
and impartial manner in which he has discharged the duties of Judge of
this court" while substituting for the resident circuit judge.s0 Twenty-
four lawyers signed a letter urging the judge to run for re-election in 1855
because of his ability and impartiality.' Thomas Dent, a former President
of the Illinois Bar Association, agreed, stating that Judge Davis discharged
his trial court duties with such "firmness for the right" and "strong sense of
equity" that he gave "satisfaction to the bar and to the people."5
The impartiality of Davis led lawyers to submit cases to the judge
without a jury, and his decisions "evoked fewer appeals than[] those of
any other judge in the state."" Actual impartiality in decision-making
also meant that "[c]hanges of venue in his court were far between."54 The
judge's commitment to fairness did not permit special treatment even for
Lincoln. According to Davis's biographer Willard King, no lawyer ever
charged Davis with favoring Lincoln in court because "[t]he Judge was
scrupulously impartial with his favorite." 5 In fact, Lincoln was on the
49 KING, supra note 3, at 78. Davis's popularity with the masses included at least some
prison inmates. Letter from Edward Finegan to David Davis (June 3, 186o), available at http://
ilhpa.hpa.state.il.us/alplm/docs/DD-o27-O20.xml (relating inmate Finegan's desire that Davis
send him a few words of encouragement because Davis was his only friend).
5o Judge Davis, CHI. DAILY TRIB., June 14, 1858, at 2 (reprinting part of a Joliet newspa-
per article reproducing a resolution passed by the Will County Bar Association thanking and
complimenting Judge Davis).
51 Letter from Thomas M. Moffett et al. to David Davis (Mar. 30, 1855), in 2 COLLECTED
WORKS, supra note 35, at 3 10.
52 Thomas Dent, David Davis of Illinois: A Sketch, 53 Am. L. REV. 535, 544 (19 19).
53 WHITNEY, supra note 23, at 8o; The Record of a Civilian: A Man Who Has Strengthened
and Not Weakenedthe Republic, THE SUN (N.Y.), Mar. 15, 188o, at I [hereinafter The Record of a
Civilian] (noting that few appeals were taken from Davis's decisions because of his impartial-
ity).
54 The Record of a Civilian, supra note 53. During the time that Davis served as a trial
judge, a litigant was statutorily entitled to a change of judge upon the filing of an affidavit of
judicial bias. McGoon v. Little, 7 Ill.(2 Gilm.) 42 (Ill. 1845).
55 KING, supra note 3, at 91 (citation omitted); see also Pratt, supra note 27, at 166 (finding
no evidence to support the contention that Davis favored Lincoln in court (citation omit-
ted)); LAMON, supra note 41, at 312 (noting that while Davis advocated for Lincoln's political
advancement off the bench he acted like a judge towards Lincoln while on the bench); GARY
ECELBARGER,THE GREATCOMEBACK: How ABRAHAM LINCOLN BEATTHE ODDSTOWINTHE 186o
REPUBLICAN NOMINATION 13 (2oo8) (noting that the bond of friendship between Lincoln and
Davis "never interfered with the unbiased dispersal of duties of the judge and attorney in the
same courthouse trial"); DavidDavis, supra note 34 ("Judge Davis was fond of Mr. Lincoln-
but scrupulously impartial in his legal rulings."). But see USHER F. LINDER, REMINISCENCES OF
THE EARLY BENCH AND BAR OF ILLINOIS 182-83 (2d ed. 1879) ("Judge Davis was a very impar-
tial judge, and though not intending to show a preference for one of his lawyers over another,
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losing end of the majority of bench trials that he conducted before Davis.16
In capturing the essence of his career as a trial judge, the Chicago Tribune
stated that "[flor thirteen years Mr. Davis sat upon the Bench, amidst the
universal silence of private and party passion""
It was his equal treatment of litigants and attorneys in court that led to
public faith in the legitimacy of Davis's rulings. Actual courtroom fairness
trumped any appearance of favoritism created by the judge's off-bench
activities and personal penchant for certain attorneys. But it was not Davis's
close relationship with Lincoln and the other circuit-riding attorneys during
the day-to-day practice of law that created the greatest danger of a public
perception of judicial partiality. Instead, it was the unqualified and very
public political alliance between Lincoln and Davis that most flagrantly
violated the modern rules' design of protecting the appearance of judicial
impartiality.
B. The Political Alliance between Lincoln and Davis
The close alliance between the two friends was most evident in the
political arena." Lincoln's "strongest political backer"" campaigned
for United States Senatorial Candidate Lincoln in 1855 and 1858,-
and recruited delegates for the future President at the Illinois State
Republican Convention in May 1860.6' But without a doubt the judge's
such was the marked difference he showed to Mr. Lincoln that Lincoln threw the rest of us
into the shade.").
Linder's suspicion was not shared by others nor is it supported by the facts. See Pratt,
supra note 27, at 166 ("There is not evidence to support the contention of various writers that
Davis favored Lincoln in the courtroom.") (citing PAUL M. ANGLE, Abraham Lincoln: Circuit
Lawyer, in LINCOLN CENTENNIAL ASSOCIATION PAPERS 35 (1928)); JULIE M. FENSTER, THE CASE
OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A STORY OF ADULTERY, MURDER, AND THE MAKING OFA GREAT PRESIDENT
143 (2007) (stating that no lawyer other than Linder suspected that Davis favored Lincoln).
56 KING, supra note 3, at 91; Niehoff, ILLUSTRATED BIOGRAPHIES, supra note 42, at 183 ("It
is a tribute to Davis's impartiality that, despite his close friendship with Lincoln, he ruled for
the opposing party in forty-seven of the eighty-seven nonjury cases that Lincoln tried before
him.").
57 Gath, Visit to David Davis, CHI. nIB., Mar. 23, 1872, at 4.
58 See Kutler, supra note 18, at 520 ("Davis' political activities mark his chief histori-
cal significance, and central to all this was his close friendship and alliance with Abraham
Lincoln.").
59 DONALD, supra note 39, at 234-
6o Letter from David Davis to Julius Rockwell (Mar. 4, 1855), available at http://www.
loc.gov/rr/mss/davis-transcript.htm (stating that Davis had spent "a good deal of time
at Springfield getting things arranged for Lincoln['s]" election to the Senate); Niehoff,
ILLUSTRATED BIOGRAPHIES, supra note 42, at 183 ("Davis enthusiastically campaigned for
Lincoln in his two losing bids for the U.S. Senate....").
61 ALBERTA. WOLDMAN, LAWYER LINCOLN 264 (1936) ("[Davis] laid aside his judicial robes
to devote all his time to lining up the Illinois delegates at the Republican State Convention at
Decatur, May 9 and o, 186o....").
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greatest contribution to the political fortunes of Lincoln was developing
and implementing a strategy to secure his nomination at the Republican
National Convention in 1860.
1. The Republican Convention of 1860.-In mid-May 1860, Judge Davis
adjourned court in Danville, Illinois, in order to attend the Republican
National Convention as a Lincoln delegate.6 1 Upon arriving in Chicago,
four days before the convention was to begin, Davis learned that all
presidential contenders, "except Lincoln, had established headquarters"
and deployed operatives." The judge immediately rented hotel rooms at
the Tremont House at his own expense,6 created a strategy, and launched
an organization designed to move delegates into the Lincoln camp, if not
on the first ballot, then on the second.6 s He worked tirelessly and brilliantly
to accomplish what more seasoned convention organizers said was
impossible for a rookie like Davis-his candidate's nomination.6 Lincoln
biographer Albert Woldman concluded: "more than any other man [Davis]
became responsible for Lincoln's winning the Republican nomination for
President."a6
2. The Political Activities ofJudge Davis-Nomination to Inauguration.-Davis
remained chiefcampaign adviser and coordinator during the period between
Lincoln's nomination and election. He assumed primary responsibility for
fund-raising 6 and traveled to the pivotal states of Indiana, Pennsylvania,
62 Letter from David Davis to Abraham Lincoln (Aug. 30, 1860), available a http://www.
lawpracticeofabrahamlincoln.org/Documents.aspx (explaining that Davis did not decide the
"Davenport case" as planned because he "adjourned the court for the Chicago convention").
63 KING, stpra note 3, at 135.
64 The Record of a Civilian, supra note 53 (reporting that Davis paid $ioo a night for
the two rooms, expended about $700 of his own money during the convention, and refused
Lincoln's offer of reimbursement); Leonard Swett, Memorial Address: The Life and Services
of David Davis (Jan. 11 -12, 1887), in CONSTITUTION OF THE ILLINOIS STATE BAR AsSOCIATION
AND ITS OFFICERS AND COMMITTEEs 75, 79 (stating that Davis paid a "bonus" to evacuate guests
from the rooms); KING, supra note 3, at 135.
65 See KING, supra note 3, at 135-42.
66 See id. at 139.
67 WOLDMAN, supra note 61, at 264; see also GOODWIN, supra note 4o, at 173 ("Judd, along
with Davis, would do more than anyone else to assure Lincoln's nomination at the Chicago
convention . . . ."); Death of David Davis, BROOKLYN DAILY EAGLE, June 26, 1886, at 2 (opin-
ing that without Davis's "foresight and fidelity [Lincoln's nomination] would not have oc-
curred").
68 Davis requested and received funds from Thurlow Weed for use in the New York
and Pennsylvania campaigns. BRUCE CHADWICK, LINCOLN FOR PRESIDENT: AN UNLIKELY
CANDIDATE, AN AUDACIOUS STRATEGY, AND THE VICTORY No ONE SAW COMING 186, 189, 202
(2oo9). He also raised money for campaign expenditures in Indiana through his friend John
Z. Goodrich, who served as Massachusetts Republican National Committeeman. KING, supra
note 3, at 154.
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and New York as Lincoln's surrogate to negotiate with state and party
leaders. 69 The political activity of Davis in Illinois in the months before
the November 1860 election was virtually non-stop: "All that summer
Davis thought of little other than the [presidential] campaign, going to
rallies, making speeches, raising funds, . . . attending weekly meetings of
the [Republican] State Central Committee, [and] smoothing out disputes
between local candidates . ".... a On Election Day, Davis accompanied
Lincoln and a small group of friends to the Illinois State Capital building,
and later to the telegraph office, to await vote totals." At Lincoln's
invitation, Davis joined the inaugural train trip to Washington." While in
transit, he participated in Lincoln's decision to travel through dangerous
Baltimore at night to forestall a rumored assassination attempt." Davis was
also an early reviewer of the first inaugural address. 4 In the months before
the inauguration Davis continued in his advisory role on personal and
governmental matters and served as an "intermediary in the complicated
and politically treacherous task of Cabinet-making." 5 For example, on
December 20, 1860, Lincoln, Davis, and Leonard Swett 6 spent the entire
day with Thurlow Weed to obtain the New York political boss's view of
secessionist threats and recommendations for cabinet posts. During the
period between Lincoln's election and inauguration, Davis did not hesitate
to suggest candidates for government jobs7 8 and probably "secured more
69 See KING, supra note 3, at 154 (describing Davis's consultations with Thurlow Weed,
Governor Edwin D. Morgan, Horace Greeley, and Henry Winter Davis in New York); id. at
152-53 (describing Davis's trip to Pennsylvania to meet with Senator Simon Cameron, news-
paper editor Russell Errett, and others); id. at 157 (stating that Davis met with twenty or thirty
Republican leaders in Indianapolis); seealso CHADWICK, supra note 68, at 179-205 (detailing the
campaign activities of Davis in Illinois, Indiana, New York, and Pennsylvania).
70 KING, supra note 3, at 149. When the courts reconvened in September 186o, Davis
found a replacement so he could continue his Republican campaign activities. Id. at 156.
71 GOODWIN, supra note 4o, at 276-77.
72 DONALD, supra note 39, at 273; KING, supra note 3, at 175.
73 3 JOHN G. NICOLAY & JOHN HAY, ABRAHAM LINCOLN: A HISTORY 311-15 (1904).
74 DOUGLAS L. WILSON, LINcOLN's SWORD: THE PRESIDENCY AND THE POWER OF WORDS
57-58 (2oo6); RONALD C. WHITE, JR., THE ELOQUENT PRESIDENT: A PORTRAIT OF LINCOLN
THIROUGH His WORDS 67 (2oo5) ("Davis ... appreciated the speech and made no sugges-
tions.").
75 Kutler, supra note 18, at 522. Kutler also describes Davis as "the nearest thing to an
eminence grise Lincoln ever had." Id.
76 Leonard Swett was a political ally of Lincoln and a business partner of Thurlow Weed.
Thurlow Weed (i 797-1882), MR. LINCOLN's WHITE HOUSE, http://www.mrlincolnswhitehouse.
orglinside.asp?ID=4o&subjectlD=2 (last visited Sept. 12, 2010).
77 See KING, supra note 3, at 167.
78 See, e.g., Letter from David Davis to Abraham Lincoln (Mar. 6, 186I), availableathttp://
www.lib.rochester.edu/index.cfm?page=538&Print=3i6 (recommending Joseph E. Streeter
for a Nebraska judgeship); Letter from David Davis and Leonard Swett to Abraham Lincoln
(Nov. 22, 186o), available at http://ilhpa.hpa.state.il.us/alplm/docs/DD-oz8-oI5.xmi (recom-
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positions for friends than any other man."79 Davis was "recognized as a
power in the new administration and was almost as much sought after as
Lincoln."'
3. ThePresidentandtheSupremeCourtJustice.-The close personal and political
association between the two friends continued after Lincoln appointed
Davis to the Supreme Court in October 1862.1 The newest Associate
Justice provided advice on numerous and varied governmental matters.
For instance, he suggested to Lincoln that cabinet members Salmon Chase
and Montgomery Blair should be fired" and that the President change
his emancipation policy." Davis also recommended military promotions,8
criticized Attorney General James Speed," and suggested a replacement
for Chief Justice Taney.16 As Doris Kearns Goodwin concluded, Abraham
Lincoln "listened carefully" to David Davis when he was on the Supreme
Court."'
As the election of 1864 approached, Davis resumed his role as campaign
manager. He held strategy meetings with the President and others and was
asked by Lincoln to attend the National Convention of the Union Party
(a coalition of Republicans and war Democrats) scheduled for June in
Maryland.88 Davis kept close tabs on delegate counts, and when the New
York and Ohio delegates received instructions to vote for the President,
Davis knew that Lincoln would be re-nominated and decided not to travel
to Baltimore." If a "speck of opposition" appeared, then Justice Davis
mending George W. Lawrence for the office of "Navy Agent at Boston[] or Consul General of
the British Possessions of North America").
79 KING, supra note 3, at 175 (citation omitted).
8o Id. at 179.
81 The close friendship did not prevent Davis from getting on Lincoln's nerves from
time to time. For example, Davis's constant supplication of Lincoln to grant a furlough and
military promotion to William Orme (a partner of Leonard Swett) caused some "constraint"
between the President and the judge. KING, supra note 3, at 205. In Lincoln's words, "'[Davis]
bothers me nearly to death."' Id. at 206 (citation omitted).
82 Id. at 208.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 205 (discussing a letter from Davis to Lincoln requesting that William Orme be
promoted to brigadier general).
85 Id. at 228.
86 Id. at 223-24.
87 GOODWIN, supra note 40, at 504; see also DONALD, supra note 39, at 483 (stating that
Davis remained a "political advisor" to Lincoln while serving on the Supreme Court); DAVID
M. SILVER, LINCOLN'S SUPREME COURT 81 (1956) ("Justice Davis did not hesitate to write to
Lincoln about political matters and on several occasions intervened to support certain candi-
dates for office or to obtain political favors.").
88 KING, supra note 3, at 213-17.
89 Letter from David Davis to Abraham Lincoln (June 2, 1864) (on file with author) ("I
[Davis] had intended going [sic] to the Baltimore convention, but since the New York and
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would have again personally directed convention efforts."
4. Examining the Political Activity of Judge Davis under Modern Standards.-
Under twentieth and twenty-first century standards, the activities of Judge
Davis present a tutorial on how to violate nearly every appearance-based
rule designed to shelter the public from discovering a judge's political
leanings. The 1924 Canons made political involvement taboo because "it
is inevitable that suspicion of being warped by political bias will attach to a
judge who becomes the active promoter of the interests of one political party
as against another."" The most recent version of the ABA Model Judicial
Code continues to dictate that judges must, "to the greatest extent possible,
be free and appear to be free from political influence and political pressure"
because "[plublic confidence in the independence and impartiality of the
judiciary is eroded if judges . . . are perceived to be subject to political
influence."" To avoid any possible perception that partisan entanglements
have corrupted a judge, the political activity routinely engaged in by Davis
is now outlawed.93
Judges today are generally prohibited from publicly endorsing
candidates;" acting as a leader in a political organization; 95 speaking on
behalf of a political organization;' soliciting funds for, or donating funds
to, a candidate or political group;97 attending political events;98 publicly
Ohio conventions, the necessity for doing so is foreclosed.").
9o Id.
91 CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 28 (1924).
92 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 4.1 cmts. 1, 3 (2007).
93 The type of political activity in which state judges are permitted to engage depends
to some extent upon whether the particular state's judiciary is chosen by partisan elections,
non-partisan elections, or appointment. Judicial Campaigns and Elections: Campaign Conduct,
AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, http://www.judicialselection.us/judicialselection/cam-
paigns-and-elections/campaign-conduct.cfm?state (last visited Oct. 8, 201o) (summarizing
differences among states in permitted campaign activity by judges). Federal judges are strictly
prohibited from acting as a leader or office-holder in a political organization; making speeches
for a political organization or candidate; publicly endorsing or opposing candidates; solicit-
ing funds for, paying an assessment to, or making a contribution to a political candidate or
organization; attending a political event; or engaging "in any other political activity." CODE OF
CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 5 (2009).
94 See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 4.(A)(3) (2007). Rule 4.2 of the 2007 Code
allows a candidate for elective judicial office to publicly endorse or oppose another candidate
for the same judicial office. Id. R. 4 .2(B)(3). See also ILL. Sup. CT. R. 67(B)(I)(b)(iv) (2009)
(permitting a judicial candidate to endorse or oppose any other candidate in a public election
in which the judicial candidate is running).
95 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 4.i(A)(i) (2007).
96 Id. R. 4.1 (A)(2).
97 Id. R. 4.1(A)(4). Rule 4.2 of the 2007 Code permits a candidate for elective judicial
office to contribute to a political organization or candidate. Id. R. 4.2(B)(6).
98 Id. R. 4.I(A)(5). Rule 4.2 of the 2007 Code permits a candidate for elective judicial
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identifying themselves as a candidate of a political party;" and serving as
a delegate to a political convention.1oo Some states prohibit a judge from
attending a nominating caucus'0' or signing a nominating petition."oz
Stretching the appearance standard even further, judges are prohibited
from publicly supporting the candidacy of a spouse or child, apparently
on the theory that the public will view such support as based upon party
loyalty rather than family loyalty.'0
The modern rules proscribing political activity are clearly designed
to protect the appearance of judicial impartiality rather than impartiality
itself. Consider, for example, that each of the four successive versions of
the ABA Model Code prohibits a judge from publicly endorsing or opposing
another candidate for public office.'" By contrast, private endorsements
are not precluded. 0 In upholding the ban on public endorsements, the
Nevada Supreme Court pulled no punches in stating that the purpose of
the rule serves the state's interest in protecting the appearance of judicial
impartiality.'0 In the Nevada court's view "[ilt is the public pronouncement
of support that most offends our notions of impartiality. A private promise of
support to a candidate, like a private contribution of money, creates less of a
perception of partiality." 0 7 Thus, under the appearance theory, a judge may
support a candidate or ideology as long as he or she keeps it a secret from
the general public. Such a rule hides a partisan or political bias but does
nothing to ensure that it will not infect judicial decision-making. 0o Indeed,
office to attend functions sponsored by a political organization or candidate. Id. R. 4.2(B)(4).
99 Id. R. 4.I(A)(6). Rule 4.2 of the 2007 Code permits a candidate in a partisan judicial
election to be identified as a candidate of a political organization. Id. R. 4.2(C)(I).
ioo In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Blauvelt, 8oi P.ad 235, 237-38 (Wash. 1990).
iol E.g., Colorado Judicial Ethics Advisory Bd., Op. 2oo8-2 (2oo8).
102 E.g., Florida Comm. on Standards of Conduct Governing Judges, Op. 92-32 (1992),
available at http://www.jud6.org/LegalCommunity/LegalPractice/opinions/jeacopinions/
nineta/92-32.html.
103 See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 4.1 cmt. 5 (2007) ("A judge or judicial can-
didate must not become involved in, or publicly associated with, a family member's political
activity or campaign for public office.").
104 Id. R. 4.I(A)(3) (2007) (prohibiting a judge from endorsing or opposing a candidate
for public office); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(I)(b) (1990) (same); CODE
OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(A)(I)(b) (1972) ("A judge or a candidate for election to judicial
office should not . . . endorse a candidate for public office."); CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS
Canon 28 (1924) ("[A judge] should avoid ... the public endorsement of candidates for politi-
cal office."); see also supra note 92 and accompanying text.
105 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(i)(b) cmt. (1990) ("[Canon] 5(A)(I)
(b) does not prohibit a judge or judicial candidate from privately expressing his or her views
on judicial candidates or other candidates for public office.").
io6 In reVincent, 172 P.3d 605, 6o8-io (NeV. 2007).
107 Id. at 6Io.
io8 Siefert v. Alexander, 597 E Supp. 2d 86o, 873 (W.D. Wis. 2009) (finding that the en-
dorsement prohibition "does not eliminate potential bias, but only hides it").
[Vol. 99274
BIG JUDGE DAVIS
an argument could be made that public confidence would be strengthened,
not hindered, by disclosing a judge's close political relationships.'0
Unencumbered by rules regulating appearances, Justice Davis wore
his partisan political opinions and allegiances on his sleeve for all to see.
Any objective nineteenth, twentieth, or twenty-first century observer
would agree that Davis appeared to have unbreakable bonds of loyalty to
President Lincoln and the Republican Party when he came face to face
with the most significant case of his judicial career.
5. Ex Pare Milligan.-
a.The Facts
On October 5, 1864, Lambdin P. Milligan was arrested by U.S. Army
officials in Indiana and charged with inciting insurrection, communicating
with the enemy, and conspiracy to seize Union munitions and free
Confederate prisoners.110 In January 1865, he was tried, convicted, and
sentenced to death by a military commission that "President Abraham
Lincoln had unilaterally created."'" Two weeks after Lincoln's death,
President Andrew Johnson approved the sentence.1 2 Milligan's lawyers
filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Indiana federal district
court. Local district court judge David McDonald and Justice David Davis,
while performing circuit duties, jointly heard the petition." McDonald and
Davis agreed to disagree on whether a military court had jurisdiction to try
a civilian. As a result, a "certificate of division" was filed in the case, which
allowed the matter to advance to the Supreme Court.14 Unsurprisingly, the
case received national attention."Is After all, the President's war powers and
reputation were at stake. Moreover, Republicans were depending on the
Supreme Court to sustain the operation of the military courts in order to
bolster their reconstruction plans." 6
Appearances belied any hope that Davis could decide the case
iog Id.
I o Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2,6-7 (1866).
III William G. Howell, Wartime Judgments of Presidential Power: Striking Down but Not
Back, 93 MINN. L. REV. I778, 1796 (2009) (citation omitted).
112 Kutler, supra note 18, at 524.
113 George Geib & Donald Kite, Federal Justice and Moral Refonn in the United States
District Court in Indiana, 1856-1869,37 IND. L. REV. 619, 627 (2004).
114 Brief for Civil War Historians as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 29, AI-Marri
v. Spagone, 129 S. Ct. 1545 (2oo9) (No. o8-368) (stating that McDonald and Davis "feigned
disagreement and certified their supposed split decision to the Supreme Court"); KING, Supra
note 3, at 250.
115 See infra Part I.B.5.c.
ii6 Oren Gross, Chaos andRules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional?,
1 I2 YALE L.J. IOI I, 1056 n.19o (2003).
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impartially. Not only had Davis and the deceased President maintained
a longstanding personal, professional, and political alliance, but also
Davis had spent a good portion of his adult life actively and publicly
promoting Lincoln's interests.'" Additionally, the judge had helped build
the Republican Party, "I whose members vehemently desired a decision
upholding the authority of Congress to install military commissions in the
South. He owed his Supreme Court appointment to Lincoln, had publicly
rebuked Copperheads like Milligan," 9 knew Justice Field's brother was on
Milligan's defense team,'z and realized he would be the only Republican
member of the Court voting to overturn the military commissions. To
top off all appearances, Davis was serving as the administrator of the late
President's estate"' and, at Robert Lincoln's insistence, would be appointed
Tad Lincoln's guardian."' These overwhelming personal and partisan
considerations completely destroyed any appearance of impartiality. But
Davis rose above appearances and provided a lesson in actual impartiality.
117 See 2 WILLIAM H. HERNDON & JESSE W. WEIK, ABRAHAM LINCOLN: THE TRUE STORY OF
A GREAT LIFE 211 (New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1895) ("It is not extravagance, taking their
long association together in mind, to say that Davis had done more for Lincoln than any dozen
other friends he had.").
I 18 Frank Sullivan, Jr., Indianapolis Judges and Lawyers Dramatize Ex parte Milligan, a
Historical Trial of Contemporary Significance, 37 IND. L. REV. 661, 662 (2004) (describing Davis
as a founder of the Republican party).
I19 As part of his charge to the Indianapolis grand jury in May 1863, Davis singled out
Copperhead organizations like the Knights of the Golden Circle and Sons of Liberty by
instructing the jurors:
It is charged that there are secret organizations . . . having for their
objects-resistance to Law, and the overthrow of the Government...
. If anywhere in this State bad men have combined together for such
wicked purposes, I pray you, bring them to light and let them receive
the punishment due to their crime.
KING, supra note 3, at 210 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Davis
expressed the same sentiment in the Milligan opinion. Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2,
130 (1866).
120 Justice Stephen Field's brother, David Dudley Field, was one of the attorneys repre-
senting Milligan. BRIAN McGINTY, LINCOLN AND THE COURT 252 (2008); see also John P. Frank,
Disqualification ofJudges, 56 YALE L.J. 6o5, 617 (1947) (noting that apparently no objection was
raised to Justice Field's practice of remaining on cases in which his brother was involved)
(citation omitted); Adrian M. Tocklin, Pennoyer v. Neff: The Hidden Agenda of Stephen J. Field,
28 SETON HALL L. REv. 75, 1o8 n.zzo (1997) (stating that the author was unable to find an
instance in which Justice Field disqualified himself from a case argued by his brother).
121 Pratt, supra note 27, at 174 (stating that Davis became the administrator of Lincoln's
estate on June 14, 1865).




The Court vacated Milligan's conviction, finding that the military
tribunal had no jurisdiction over a citizen of a non-seceding state in
which civilian courts were open. In finding that the military commissions
created by Lincoln were unconstitutional, Davis, writing for the majority,
"chastised" the late President:'
The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people, equally
in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of
men, at all times, and under all circumstances. No doctrine, involving more
pernicious consequences, was ever invented by the wit of man than that
any of its provisions can be suspended during any of the great exigencies of
government. Such a doctrine leads directly to anarchy or despotism, but the
theory of necessity on which it is based is false; for the government, within
the Constitution, has all the powers granted to it, which are necessary to
preserve its existence; as has been happily proved by the result of the great
effort to throw off its just authority.'24
The four Democrats on the Court (Nelson, Grier, Clifford, and Field)
signed onto Davis's majority opinion. Three Republican Justices (Swayne,
Miller, and Wayne) joined in a concurring opinion authored by a fellow
Republican, Chief Justice Salmon Chase. Chase agreed with Davis that a
President could not authorize a military commission, but to the delight of
Republicans wrote that Congress could do so under its war powers. 2 s
c. The Aftermath
Davis and his opinion were brutally attacked by members of the political
party that he had helped to found. The Republican Party produced a
pamphlet "condemning the opinion in scalding terms."' 6 Davis was charged
with erroneous statements of fact and "feeble and false" assertions of law.
27
Reconstructionists in Congress detested the opinion because it jeopardized
their ability to replace civilian courts in the South with military tribunals."'
123 Ralph Ruebner, Democracy, Judicial Review and the Rule of Law in the Age of Terrorism:
The Experience of Israel-A Comparative Perspective, 31 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 493, 501 (2003)
("Justice Davis chastised the President for acting outside the law in time of war ..
124 Milligan, 71 U.S. at 120-21.
125 Id.at 137.
126 KING, supra note 3, at 256. The pamphlet was entitled "Review of the Decision
of the United States Supreme Court in the cases of Lambdin P. Milligan and others, The
Indiana Conspirators," and was published by the Union Congressional Executive Committee.
6 CHARLES FAIRMAN, Reconstruction and Reunion 1864-88, in HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES 232 n.I65 (1971).
127 KING, supra note 3, at 257 (internal quotation marks omitted).
128 Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal CourtJurisdiction: Early Implementation
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Congressman Thaddeus Stevens showed the depth of Republican hostility
by classifying the opinion as "far more dangerous" than the Dred Scott
decision and claiming that it "unsheathed the dagger of the assassin, and
place[d] the knife of the rebel at the throat of every man who dare[d] [to]
proclaim himself . . . a loyal Union man."'" Republican Representative
James Wilson of Iowa was not much kinder when he described the opinion
as a "piece of judicial impertinence which we are not bound to respect."u0
He further singled out "Davis and his concurring associates" as manifesting
"most singularly crude ideas of the great questions they are discussing.""'
Republican newspapers joined the assault. The New York Herald
followed Congressman Stevens's lead by comparing the "two-faced,"
"utterly preposterous" majority opinion to the Dred Scott decision."' After
declaring that treason found a new home "in the bosom of the Supreme
Court," the Washington Chronicle observed that its editors had not "met a
Republican who does not speak with contempt of the language of Justice
Davis."1 The Philadelphia North American personalized the attack by
claiming that Lincoln "made a mistake in appointing a Judge of the fatal
name of Davis."3'
Davis's response to the mugging by the Republican Party, legislators,
and press was what one would expect from an individual dedicated to
resolving factual and legal questions in an independent, non-partisan
manner. In a letter to his cousin, Davis wrote:
[T]his court wd [sic] be a hell on earth to me, unless I can decide questions
according to the light which God has given me. I hope that God will give
me strength to utter my convictions & never to quail before any political
tempest. Courts are made to interpret the will of the people as manifested
through Laws & Constitutions.
3
1
But even the brutal and unwarranted attack upon Davis did not destroy his
of and Departures from the Constitutional Plan, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1515, 1594 n.288 (1986)
("Ex parte Milligan was the major case creating Congress' fear of the Court's reaction to the
Reconstruction program."); Terence J. Lau, Judiial Independence: A Callfor Reform, 9 NEv. L.J.
79, 104-05 (2oo8) (stating that replacing civilian courts in the South with military commissions
was a "central tenet" of Republican reconstruction plans (citation omitted)); Pratt, supra note
27, at 173 ("The Reconstructionists in Congress objected seriously to [the opinion].").
129 CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 2D SESS. 251 (1867) (statement of Rep. Thaddeus
Stevens).
130 CONG. GLOBE, 40TH CONG., 2D SESS. 1484 (1867) (statement of Rep. James Wilson).
131 Id. at 1484-85. Congressman Wilson agreed with Chase's concurring opinion. Id.
132 2 CHARLES WARREN, TYIE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 431-32 (rev.
ed. 1937).
133 Id. at 433 (internal quotation marks omitted).
134 Id. at 433 n. I (internal quotation marks omitted).




reputation for impartiality. Upon leaving the Supreme Court thirteen years
after the Milligan decision, he would take his well-earned reputation for
non-partisanship to the United States Senate.
6. Public Life after the Supreme Coury--In 1877, the Illinois state legislature
elected Justice Davis to replace John Logan as United States senator."'
The selection process ended on the fortieth ballot when the Democrats
abandoned their candidate and united with independents to choose
Davis.3 7 Although he did not seek the office, Davis accepted it.13 8 He
resigned from the Supreme Court and took a seat on the Republican side of
the Senate but did not attend either party's caucus.'39 As some Republicans
noted, the new Senator was less political than any of the other candidates
in the Illinois senatorial race and was "about as much Republican as
Democratic."'o Davis, considered a true independent, voted his mind on
the basis of issues, not party affiliation.141 He supported the Democrat,
Winfred S. Hancock, in the 1880 presidential election, and the Republican,
James G. Blaine, in the 1884 contest.142
After succeeding slain President James Garfield in September 1881,
Chester Arthur called a special meeting of the Senate in order to elect a new
presiding officer. 43 Upon motion of the Republicans, Davis was elected
president pro tempore of the Senate.'" Both political parties viewed Davis
136 ELBERT WILLIAM R. EWING, HISTORY AND LAW OF THE HAYES-TILDEN CONTEST BEFORE
THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION: TIE FLORIDA CASE 1876-77, at 40-43 (19io). Davis's election as
United States senator prevented him from serving on the fifteen-member commission created
by Congress to decide the disputed presidential election of 1876. With seven Republicans and
seven Democrats on the commission, Davis was to be the "non-partisan, impartial member"
who would, in effect, choose the next president. See id. (stating that the Democrats "were not
so sure of Davis' politics as they were of his sterling honesty"); see generally, Closeness of Vote: A
Reminder of 1876, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1916, at 6.
137 Decided: The Senatorial Contest Comes to an End on the Fortieth Ballot, CHI. DAILY MIB.,
Jan. 26, 1877, at 5 [hereinafter Decided]. Davis was seen as a "'dark horse' in the Senate cam-
paign. State Affairs, CmI. DAILY TRIB., Jan 12, 1877, at I.
138 Pratt, supra note 27, at 178; Decided, supra note 137 (reporting Davis's statement that
"he not been consulted regarding the use of his name as a [senatorial] candidate").
139 Pratt, supra note 27, at 178.
14o Decided, supra note 137.
141 Pratt, supra note 27, at 178; David Davis: Ex-President Lincoln's Friend, Alarmingly Ill,
RICHMOND DISPATCH, May 15, 1886, at 4 ("[Davis] was elected to the Senate as an Independent,
and acted as one while a member."); CHARLEs A. CHURCH, HISTORY OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY
IN ILLINoIs 1854-1912, at 131 (19 12).
142 Kutler, supra note 18, at 527; see also Senator David Davis, BROOKLYN DAILY EAGLE,
Aug. 9, 188o, at 2 (quoting portions of a letter written by Davis in support of presidential
candidate Winfred Hancock).




as above partisan rivalries. 4 In accepting his new office, the president pro
tempore emphasized his lifelong approach to public service in both the
judicial and legislative branches, stating, "I am profoundly gratified for this
work of confidence and it shall be my endeavor, as it will be my duty to
administer the trust with impartiality and with entire fairness."'"
According to Harper's Weekly, Davis maintained his independent status
by winning and retaining the respect of Republicans and Democrats.147 As
presiding officer of the Senate, Davis stood next in the line of succession
for the presidency and was addressed by President Garfield and the New
York Times as "'Mr. Vice President."'4
The reputation of David Davis for impartiality rested upon the manner
in which he performed his official duties as a circuit judge, Supreme Court
Justice, and later as a United States Senator. Appearances created by private
activities and relationships did not diminish that reputation.
II. THE ASCENDANCY OF APPEARANCES
How did we travel from the point where a judge's extrajudicial activi-
ties were essentially ignored in assessing his or her judicial impartiality,
to the point where appearances are now the benchmark in determining a
judge's faithfulness to his or her oath? The journey from reality to percep-
tion is briefly surveyed in this Part.
A. Judicial Ethics in the 1800s
Codes of judicial conduct did not exist during Davis's tenure on the
bench. Instead, performance of the judicial function was evaluated by the
generally accepted cultural norms of nineteenth-century America. Promi-
nent seventeenth-century judge Sir Matthew Hale summarized the norms
prevalent in his era in his Rules for Judicial Guidance.'49 Simply put, actual
impartiality was Hale's judicial performance standard. Hale's Rules ad-
vised judges (1) to lay aside personal passions while judging;'s (2) to avoid
prejudging cases and to withhold judgment until all parties are heard; s'
145 See DAVID N. ATKINSON, LEAVING THE BENCH: SUPREME COURT JUSTICES AT THE END
56 (1999).
146 A Successful Scheme: David Davis Made President of the Senate, DAILY GLOBE (St. Paul,
Minn.), Oct. 14, 1881, at I (quoting David Davis).
147 David Davis, HARPERS'S WEEKLY, July 3, 1886, at 420.
148 KING, supra note 3, at 302. See also Illness of Judge David Davis, N.Y. TIMES, May 6,
1886, at 4 (referring to "ex-Vice-President David Davis").
149 In re Code of Judicial Conduct, 643 So. 2d 1037, 1038 n.2 (Fla. 1994) (citing Matthew






(3) not to be "biased with compassion to the poor or favor to the rich";
(4) not to be influenced by "popular or court applause, or distaste";"s3 (5)
to keep "exactly . . . to the rules of justice";15 4 (6) to set aside all distrac-
tion and cares while attending to court business; 55 (7) to "abhor all private
solicitations";"s6 and (8) to administer justice "uprightly," "deliberately,"
and "resolutely."15 1
A century after Hale announced his Rules, the identical standard of
freedom from partiality was the central theme expressed at the dedication
of the first territorial court of the Northwest Territory in Marietta, Ohio. At
the September 2, 1788, opening of the court, the sheriff, with sword drawn
and accompanied by lawyers, townspeople, and judges, proclaimed that the
territorial "court is opened for the administration of even-handed justice
to the poor and the rich, to the guilty and the innocent, without respect of
persons, no one to be punished without a trial by their peers, and then in
pursuance of the laws and evidence in the case.""1 8
Davis's contemporary, the highly respected and influential lawyer,
Rufus Choate placed impartiality at the center of judicial ethics when he
told the delegates of the 1853 Massachusetts Constitutional Convention
that a judge
shall know nothing about the parties; everything about the case. He shall do
everything for justice; nothing for himself; nothing for his friend; nothing for
his patron; nothing for his sovereign. If, on one side, is the executive power,
and the legislature, and the people-the sources of his honors, the givers of
his daily bread-and on the other an individual nameless and odious, his
eye is to see neither, great nor small; attending only to the "trepidations of
the balance."'5 9
David Davis and Rufus Choate would agree with Lord Hale that secondary
appearance cues are not helpful in determining whether a judge possesses
the trait of judicial impartiality. Hale believed that if a judge was partial
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standers."lw Appearances created by friendships, political activity, civic
involvement, or other extrajudicial behavior simply did not influence the
nineteenth-century public's perception of a judge's fairness in carrying out
official duties.
The fact that appearances were of little concern during the nineteenth
century is illustrated by the absence of rules prohibiting the bane of all
appearance-based judicial ethics -political activity by judges. Appearances
of political partisanship were of little concern in the 1800s, and as a result,
judges engaged in political activity rather freely. Davis's intense campaign
involvement was not unusual. For example, Brooklyn Municipal Court
Judge Erastus Dean Culver was among the dignitaries seated on the dais
during Lincoln's famous Cooper Union address. By popular demand Judge
Culver addressed the crowd after Lincoln.' 1 Likewise, Judge William
Robertson continued in politics with gusto while serving as a county judge
in New York from 1855 until 1867.162 During that time he supported the
candidacy of Lincoln, served as a member of two electoral colleges, and was
the de facto leader of the Republicans in Westchester County.'63 Under the
1844 New Jersey Constitution, it was not unethical for judges to participate
directly in politics by making donations and campaign speeches." Most
notably, Davis's fellow Supreme Court Justices actively engaged in politics
while on the bench.Although never nominated, Justice John McLean sought
the presidential nomination in 1836, 1848, 1852, 1856, and 1860.161 Justice
Salmon Chase campaigned for a party nomination four times. 66 Justice
Stephen Field entered the fray in 1880 and 1884.167 Not to be outdone
by his bench mates, Justice Davis received, and eventually declined, the
presidential nomination of the Labor Reform Party in 1872.161
Written judicial ethics codes, with their heavy reliance on avoiding
improper appearances, would not arrive until the early part of the next
century.
160 MATTHEw HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 163 (Charles M.
Grayed., 197').
161 See HAROLD HOLZER, LINCOLN AT COOPER UNION 106, 146-47 (zoo6).
162 Kenneth H. Lange, Our First President Judge William H. Robertson the "Bismarck of
Katonah," 35 WESTCHESTER B.J. 29, 32 (2oo8) ("There were no legal or ethical constraints in
the nineteenth century on political activity by judges....
163 Id.
164 In rr Gaulkin, 351 A.2d 740, 744 (N.J. 1976).
165 Peter Alan Bell, ExtrajudicialActivity of Supreme Court Justices, 22 STAN. L. REV. 587,
593 n.41 (1970).
166 Id. (stating that Justice Chase sought the presidential nomination in 1856, i86o,
1864, and 1868).
167 Id.
168 Kutler, supra note 18, at 527. Davis declined the nomination when the Liberal




B. Appearances in Modern Judicial Ethics
The appearance of impropriety concept in American jurisprudence
is derived from the purported statement of Saint Paul admonishing the
Thessalonians to "[albstain from all appearance of evil."'16 But Paul cannot
be credited or blamed for creating the appearance standard: just like many
contemporary public figures, he was misquoted. Modern biblical texts
correct the mistranslation found in the King James Version of the Bible and
now accurately report Saint Paul's actual admonishment-to "abstain from
everyform of evil."1 0 By the time the mistake came to light, however, there
was no turning back. Early twentieth-century courts became comfortable
with the notion that in order "[tlo keep the fountain of justice pure and
above reproach, the very appearance of evil should be avoided.""' The
admontion was used in reference to the duty of lawyers,"' jurors,7 3 and
sometimes judges.'74 But the warning in these early cases that judges should
avoid bad appearances merely served a hortatory purpose. Neither judicial
discipline nor disqualification rested upon appearances alone. To catapult
the fear of bad appearances from obscurity to the forefront of judicial ethics
would require the off-bench conduct of an un-saintly federal judge.
1. Judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis.-In 1920, while serving as a federal
district court judge in Chicago, Judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis was
appointed the first commissioner of Major League Baseball.7 5 He held
both jobs simultaneously, earning annually $7,500 as a judge and $42,500
as baseball commissioner.' 6 The ABA considered the dual employments
169 1 Thessalonians 5:22 (King James); In re Harriss, 4 N.E.zd 387, 388 (Ill. 1936) ("[The
1924 Canons of Judicial Ethics] were all succinctly summed up by St. Paul centuries ago when
he advised the Thessalonians to abstain from all appearance of evil."); FIEDLER,supra note 158,
at 397 ("Many writings on judicial ethics begin with Paul's exhortation to the Thessalonians:
'From all appearance of evil refrain yourselves.'" (citation omitted)).
170 E.g., I Thessalonians 5:22 (New Revised Standard Version) ("abstain from every
form of evil"); I Thessalonians 5:22 (American Standard Version) (same); i Thessalonians 5:22
(English Standard Version) ("Abstain from every form of evil."); see also I Thessalonians 5:22
(New International Version) ("Avoid every kind of evil.").
171 Eastham v. Holt, 27 S.E. 883, 894 (W.Va. 1897).
172 E.g., In re Duncan, 42 S.E. 433, 441 (S.C. 1902) (warning young lawyers "to avoid
even the appearance of evil").
173 Ayrhart v. Wilhelmy, 112 N.W. 782, 783 (Iowa 1907) ("[Jurors] should be careful not
only to avoid actual impropriety, but to keep themselves clear of the very appearance of evil.
... "); Bonnett v. Glatfeldt, ii N.E. 250, 253-54 (11. 1887) (finding that a juror created an ap-
pearance of evil by accepting a ride home from the plaintiff).
174 See, e.g., Dorlon v. Lewis, 9 How. Pr. i (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1851) ("A referee ... owes it to
himself, not only to avoid all improper influences, but even 'the appearance of evil."').
175 J.G. TAYLOR SPINK, JUDGE LANDIs AND TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF BASEBALL 72 (1947).
176 George D. Marlow, From Black Robes to White Lab Coats: The Ethical Implications of a
Judge's Sua Sponte, Ex Parte Acquisition of Social and Other Scientific Evidence During the Decision-
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a disgrace and sought to sanction Landis."' The critics' efforts were
temporarily stymied, however, because Landis violated no law or rule of
ethics and apparently performed both jobs satisfactorily."" The conclusion
that Landis had committed no actual wrongdoing was supported by the
United States Attorney General's investigation into the matter, which
determined that "nothing as a matter of general law" prohibited a district
judge from receiving compensation as an arbitrator or commissioner. 19
Moreover, one of the judge's main detractors, Congressman Benjamin
Welty, admitted that there was no evidence that the duties of baseball
commissioner interfered with the timely performance of Landis's judicial
duties.so That left the ABA with one possible basis upon which to condemn
the judge-appearances. In September 1921, the ABA censured Landis for
"conduct unworthy of the office of judge, derogatory to the dignity of the
Bench, and undermining public confidence in the independence of the
judiciary."' In other words, the judge was sanctioned for creating, in the
collective mind of the members of the ABA, appearances detrimental to
the legal profession.
As a result of the Landis affair, the ABA created a committee to draft
the first code governing the conduct of judges.'12 The committee chose
to rely primarily on the prohibition against improper appearances, on and
off the bench, to regulate judicial behavior.' Thanks to Judge Landis's
simultaneous public and private employments, which looked bad to some
but violated no ethical precept, the 1924 Canons of Judicial Ethics placed
the prohibition against the appearance of impropriety on equal footing with
the nineteenth-century prohibition against actual impropriety.
2. The 1924 Canons of Judicial Ethics.-The 1924 Canons embodied one
overriding purpose: "to encourage judges to avoid any professional or
personal conduct that could be perceived to damage the ideal image of a
judge as an impartial decisionmaker and model citizen."' Reflecting that
Making Process, 72 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 291,313 (1998).
177 See Raymond J. McKoski, Judicial Discipline and the Appearance of Impropriety: What the
Public Sees Is What the Judge Gets, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1914, 1923-24 (2010).
178 Id.
179 DAVID PIETRUSZA, JUDGE AND JURY: TIE LIFE AND TIMES OF JUDGE KENESAW MOUNTAIN
LANDIS 197 (1998) (citation omitted).
I8o See id. at 203.
181 REPORT OF THE FORTY-FOURTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
61 (1921).
182 Peter W. Morgan, Essay, The Appearance of Propriety: Ethics Reform and the Bhfil
Paradoxes, 44 STAN. L. REV. 593, 598 (1992) ("[Tihe Landis matter induced the ABA to take
action to bolster public confidence in the judiciary; the ABA responded in 1924 by issuing its
Canons of Judicial Ethics." (citation omitted)).
183 See infra notes 184-185 and accompanying text.
184 McKoski, supra note 177, at 1925.
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purpose, the Canons instructed judges to live their lives "beyond reproach,"
to avoid the "appearance of impropriety," and to ward off any suspicion or
impression that the judge's political, business, charitable, personal, or social
relationships influence the judge, interfere with judicial duties, or "warp"
court decisions.'a Sixteen separate times, the 1924 Canons cautioned judges
against conduct that created a bad appearance, impression, or suspicion.'"
Not even the casual reader could miss the central thesis of the first ABA
Model Code of Judicial Conduct.
3. The 1972 Code of Judicial Conduct.-Although some states adopted the
1924 Canons as enforceable disciplinary rules,' they were intended only
to serve as aspirational guidelines.' That changed in 1972 when the ABA
adopted a new Code of Judicial Conduct ("1972 Code").189 The Preface to
the 1972 Code clearly stated that the "canons and text establish mandatory
standards" enforceable through disciplinary proceedings.'" Canon 2 set
forth the Code's overriding and binding principle: "A Judge Should Avoid
Impropriety and the Appearance of Impropriety in All His Activities." '9
But the 1972 Code went one monumental step further by dramatically
broadening the narrow disqualification rules of the 1924 Canons.
The 1924 Canons only required a judge to disqualify himself when (1)
a near relative appeared as a litigant, or (2) the judge's direct "personal
interests" were involved. 92 The drafters of the 1972 Code felt compelled
to significantly enlarge the grounds for disqualification due to the uproar
created by the forced resignation of Supreme Court Justice Abe Fortas
and the defeat of the nomination of Clement Haynsworth to fill the Fortas
vacancy.'93 Neither violated any law, rule, or disqualification guideline,
but both created an improper appearance by remaining on cases in which
they had an insignificant or indirect financial interest." The Fortas and
Haynsworth matters dictated that the 1972 Code contain not only a list of
185 Id. at 1925 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
186 CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canons 4, 13, 19, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30, 31, 33 & 34
(1924).
187 Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Impartial Judge: Detachment or Passion?, 45 DEPAUL L. REV.
605, 606 (1996) ("[The 1924] Canons were officially adopted for use by a number of states,
although they were rarely enforced." (citation omitted)).
I88 JAMES J. ALFINI ET AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS § 1.03 (4th ed. 2007) ("The
1924 Canons ... were intended to be an ideal guide of behavior, rather than an enforceable
set of rules." (citation omitted)).
189 CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1972).
190 Id. at Preface.
191 Id. Canon 2.
192 CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canons 13, 29 (1924).
193 See McKoski, supra note 177, at 1926-30 (detailing the relationship between the
Fortas and Haynsworth defeats and the disqualification rules of the 1972 Code).
194 Id. at 1927-29.
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specific disqualifying factors similar to the 1924 Canons, but also an all-
purpose category of disqualification. '9 The broad prohibition against the
appearance of impropriety seemed to be the perfect catch-all standard to
serve as the overarching principle of judicial disqualification. 96Any conduct
appearing to reflect adversely on a judge's impartiality would constitute
grounds for disqualification. Thus, Canon 3C(1) of the 1972 Code required
disqualification "in a proceeding in which [the judge's] impartiality might
reasonably be questioned."'9 7 Appearances became the gate-keeper of the
judge's docket.
Under the 1972 Code, appearances governed every aspect of a judge's
personal and professional life. Canon 2 subjected a judge to discipline
for any judicial or extrajudicial behavior that created an appearance of
impropriety.198 Canon 3 required disqualification from matters in which a
judge appeared less than impartial.'" With most states adopting the 1972
Code, 2 00 appearances officially commanded the field of judicial ethics.
4. The 1990 Model Code of Judicial Conduct.-A revised and updated Model
Code of Judicial Conduct was promulgated by the ABA in 1990 ("1990
Code"). 20 1 Canon 2 of the 1990 Code retained the mandate that a judge
avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all professional
and personal activities. 02 The drafters of the revised code believed that
the appearance prohibition continued to serve a critical function: "to
195 Id. at 1930 (concluding that the two episodes indicated that the emerging governing
principle of judicial disqualification would be appearance-based).
196 See E. WAYNE TUODE, REPORTER'S NOTES TO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 6o-61 (1973)
(explaining the relationship between the appearance of impropriety and the disqualification
provisions of the 1972 Code).
197 CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3C(I) (1972).
198 Id. Canon 2 ("A Judge Should Avoid Impropriety and the Appearance of Impropriety
in All His Activities").
199 Id. Canon 3C() ("A judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his
impartiality might reasonably be questioned .... ").
200 ALFINI ET AL.,supra note 188, § i.o3 ("Before 199o, the 1972 Code had been adopted,
in whole or in large part, by 47 states, the District of Columbia, and the Federal Judicial
Conference." (citation omitted)). In 1974, Congress revised its judicial disqualification stat-
ute to track the language of the 1972 Code by requiring judges to disqualify whenever their
impartiality "might reasonably be questioned." Act of Dec. 5, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-512, 88
Stat. 1609 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2oo6)). The amendment was designed "to foster
the Appearance of impartiality." Potashnick v. Port City Const. Co., 609 F.d ttot, u 11(5th
Cit. 1980).
201 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1990). The 199o Code was adopted by the
ABA House of Delegates on August 7, 199o. LISA L. MILORD, TE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA
JUDICIAL CODE 63 (1992).
202 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2 (1990). The title to Canon 2 provided,




caution judges to avoid certain prospective conduct even if the conduct
only appears suspect, and to proscribe any act that is harmful even if it is
not specifically prohibited in the Code."m0 Canon 3E(1) of the 1990 Code
continued to require disqualification "in a proceeding in which the judge's
impartiality might reasonably be questioned."' Like the 1972 Code, the
1990 Code was replete with repetitive cautions to avoid bad appearances.
For example, Canon 4 dictated that a judge must not participate in extra-
judicial activities which cast doubt on the judge's impartiality;2"s solicit
memberships in charitable groups if the solicitation might be perceived
as "coercive";" engage in financial dealings that might be "perceived to
exploit" the judge's position; 0 accept gifts that could be "perceived as
intended to influence the judge";20 or receive an expense reimbursement
if it "give[s] the appearance of influencing the judge's performance . . . or
otherwise give[s] the appearance of impropriety." 2
5. The 2007 Model Code of Judicial Conduct.-In 2003, the ABA Joint
Commission to Evaluate the Model Code of Judicial Conduct (Joint
Commission) began to revise the 1990 Code.o10 Some Joint Commission
members favored retaining the "appearance of impropriety" prohibition
as a disciplinary standard, while others preferred reducing the vague
concept to the status of an aspirational guide." After three and one-half
years of debate, flip-flopping proposals, a New York Times editorial, and
intense input from law-related organizations, the ABA House of Delegates
decided to treat the appearance prohibition as an overarching principle
of judicial conduct and as a disciplinary rule.2" As a result, Canon 1 of
the 2007 Code provides that "[a] judge shall uphold and promote the
independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety."" Disciplinary Rule 1.2
makes this guiding sentiment an enforceable regulation by mandating that
203 MILORD, supra note 201, at 13.
204 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3E(i) (1990).
205 Id. Canon 4A(i).
206 Id. Canon 4C(3)(b)(iii).
207 Id. Canon 4D(I)(a).
2o8 Id. Canon 4D(5)(b).
209 Id. Canon 4H(I).
210 Mark I. Harrison, The 2007 ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct: Blueprint for a
Generation ofJudges, 28 JUST. Sys. J. 257, 257 (2007).
211 Id. at 262 (internal quotation marks omitted) (describing the competing tensions that
dominated the Joint Commission's evaluation of the appearance of impropriety standard).
212 See id.; see also McKoski, supra note 177, at 1932-36 (describing the history and de-
bate surrounding the enactment of Canon I and Rule 1.2 of the 2007 Code).
213 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon I (2007).
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"[a] judge ... shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety."2 1 4
The 2007 Code continues the duty to disqualify in any situation where a
"judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned.""'
The debate that raged within the Joint Commission regarding the proper
role of the appearance standard has not carried over to the states. To date,
the eighteen states adopting a new code based on the 2007 ABA Model
Code have included the appearance prohibition as a guiding principle and
disciplinary rule.21 6
6. The Practical Effect of the Emergence of the Appearance Standard.-Most
jurisdictions embraced the appearance-based rules found in the various
ABA Model Codes because "whatever the ABA recommends comes
with a presumption of authority, and state and federal courts are likely
to adopt it.""' In addition, the democratic nature of the appearance test
appealed to those responsible for enacting and enforcing judicial conduct
rules. Judging by appearances requires no special knowledge, training, or
experience. Neither does application of the test require an understanding
of ethics rules or the reasons behind the rules. Everyone's opinion is
entitled to equal weight when the "truth" lies in the eye of the beholder."
With the ABA's stamp of approval and the egalitarian underpinnings of
the appearance standard, it is not surprising that the focus on evaluating
judicial impartiality shifted from actualities to perceptions.
For example, no claim of improper appearances arose in 1865 when
David Dudley Field argued before the Supreme Court on behalfof Lambdin
Milligan while the attorney's brother, Justice Stephen Field, listened
from the bench.2 19 But by 1946, Justice Robert Jackson freely criticized
fellow Justice Hugo Black for sitting on a case argued by a lawyer who
214 Id. R. 1.2.
215 Id. R. 2.11(A).
216 ARIz. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2oio); ARK. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
R. 1.2 (2010); CoLo. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2010); CONN. CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT R. 1.2 (20io); DEL. JUDGES' CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.2 (20Io); HAW. CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT R.I.2 (201o); IND. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.2 (201o); IOWA CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 51:1.2 (20io); KAN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R.I.2 (2010); MD. CODE
OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2010); MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2010); MONT.
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.2 (20IO); NEB. REV. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT § 5-301-2
(2010); NEV. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.2 (zoo); OHIO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R.
1.2 (2010); UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2010); WASH. STATE CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2010); WYo. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2010).
217 Ronald D. Rotunda, Judicial Ethics, The Appearance of Impropriety, and the Proposed
New ABA JudicialCode, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1337, 1359 (2006).
218 E.g., Del Vecchio v. Ill. Dep't of Corr., 31 F-3d 1363, 1371 (7th Cir. 1994) (en banc)
("Appearances are usually for the eyes of the beholder."); Andrews v. Agric. Labor Relations
Bd., 623 P.2d 151, 156 (Cal. 1981). ("Appearance, after all, is generally in the eye of the be-
holder.").
219 See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
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two decades earlier engaged in a law practice with Black.z0 Similarly, while
judges in the 1800s openly engaged in political activity, by 1964 the New
York City bar association, seeking to protect the appearance of impartiality,
felt justified not only demanding that a judge abstain from political activity
but also insisting that he either keep his wife out of politics or resign from
the bench."' Former federal circuit judge and law school dean Howard T.
Markey recognized the stranglehold that appearances maintained on the
debate over how best to protect judicial legitimacy, stating that "[p]erhaps
ninety percent of the problems that arise in relation to judicial ethics arise
from appearances, not from reality."2 And the stranglehold tightens.
Today, judges suffer accusations of creating an appearance of partiality
under virtually limitless circumstances. A seventy-five year old Illinois
Supreme Court Justice was criticized2 3 for authoring an opinion holding the
state's mandatory judicial retirement age of seventy-five unconstitutional.2 2 4
This type of charge is especially troubling because it is reminiscent of
the claims that African American judges should be disqualified from
hearing civil rights cases, 225 and female judges should be barred from sex
discrimination lawsuits filed by female plaintiffs."' In an equally disturbing
application of appearances, a Virginia judge was advised not to serve as a
"pastor or minister at a regular church service" because he might give the
appearance of partiality toward litigants of his own faith." In a blow to
22o The case was Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local No. 6167, United Mine Workers, 325 U.S.
t61 (1945). Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in denial of a petition for rehearing includes
a disguised criticism of Justice Black's participation in the case. See Jewell Ridge Coal Corp.
v. Local No. 6167, United Mine Workers, 325 U.S. 897, 897 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring in
denial of rehearing); John P. Frank, Disqualification ofJudges, 56 YALE L.J. 605,605-06 & nn.2-3
(1947) (explaining Justice Jackson's criticism).
221 Robert E. Tomasson, Bar Asks Judge to Quit or Get Wife Out of Politics, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 12, 1964, at I (reporting that the New York City bar association urged a judge to either
"persuade his wife to give up partisan politics or to resign his judgeship" in order to avoid a
suspicion of bias).
222 Howard T. Markey, A Judicial Need for the 8o's: Schooling in Judicial Ethics, 66 NEB. L.
REV. 417, 426 (1987).
223 Abdon M. Pallasch, Never Too Old: Justices Throw OutAgeLimiton When Judges Can Seek
Retention, CHI. SUN-TIMES, June 19, 2oo9, at 14 (quoting a law professor as opining that an ap-
pearance of impropriety is created when a supreme court justice who has reached the state's
statutorily mandated retirement age authors an opinion finding the statute unconstitutional).
224 Maddux v. Blagojevich, 911 N.E.2d 979, 992 (Ill. 2009).
225 See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Local Union 542, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 388 F
Supp. 155, 162-66 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
226 See, e.g., Blank v. Sullivan & Cromwell, 418 F Supp. 1, 4 (S.D.N.Y 1975).
227 Va. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. o8-i (2oo8), available at http://www.courts.
state.va.us/agencies/jirc/opinions/2oo8/o8_I.html ("The Committee is ... of the opinion that
a judge should not act as a pastor or minister at a regular church service ... as [it] may raise a
question about the judge's ability to act impartially or may create an appearance of impropri-
ety."). The Virginia Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee withdrew Opinion o8-i on February
17, 201o, and is currently considering whether to issue a revised opinion. VIRGINIA JUDICIAL
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legal education, the Nebraska Judicial Ethics Committee determined that
a judge's presentation at a criminal defense education conference would
create an appearance of partiality toward defendants and their lawyers."
But the danger lies not only in misapplication of the appearance standard
to situations that could have no conceivable impact on actual impartiality.
Nor is the only concern the unjustified treatment of appearance and reality
as equally important in the arena of judicial conduct. The real danger today
is the elevation of the appearance of impartiality over actual impartiality."'
Some commentators have already indicated that the appearance of fairness
is possibly more important than its actuality.23 0 The overtaking of reality by
perception is undeniably foreshadowed by a recent opinion of the Florida
Supreme Court Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee.
a. Virtual Friends in Florida
In an opinion that gained national attention,"' the Florida Judicial Ethics
SYSTEM, http://www.courts.state.va.us/agencies/jirc/opinions/2oo8/o8_i.html (last visited Oct.
9, 2010).
228 Neb. Judicial Ethics Comm., Op. 06-4 (2oo6), available at http://supremecourt.
ne.gov/professional-ethics/judges/ethics-committee/pdf/o6-4.pdf ("[H]owever, even if the
actual content of the judge's comments would be largely impartial, a reasonable person view-
ing the seminar itinerary and publicity materials could perceive an impairment of the judge's
impartiality.").
229 See Roger J. Miner, Judicial Ethics in the Twenty-First Century: Tracing the Trends, 32
HOrSTRA L. REV. 1107, 1110 (2004) (stating that a recusal standard defined in terms of appear-
ances is not surprising because "in modern-day society, it is perception, rather than reality, that
has the greater importance").
230 See, e.g., Howard T Markey, A Need for Continuing Education in Judicial Ethics, 28 VAL.
U. L. REV. 647, 653 (1994) ("In building and maintaining the image of the judiciary, it is the
reasonable perception of the people that counts-and that is all that counts."); Thomas R.
Phillips & Karlene Dunn Poll, Free Speech for Judges and Fair Appeals for Litigants: Judicial
Recusalin a Post-White World, 55 DRAKE L. REv. 691, 709 (2007) ("[Rlecusal as a mechanism
for protecting the state's interest in preserving both the impartiality and, possibly more impor-
tant, the appearance of impartiality of the judiciary, has its limitations and thus critics." (cita-
tion omitted)); Drew A. Swank, In Defense of Rules and Roles: The Need to Curb Extreme Forms
of Pro Se Assistance and Accommodation in Litigation, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 1537, 1583 (2005) ("The
appearance of impartiality is just as important, if not more important, as the reality of impar-
tiality." (citation omitted)); Bethany Krajelis, An Age-Old Debate Exists About Effect of Politics
in the Judiciary, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Apr. 21, 2010, at I ("You can't have real justice until you
have an appearance of justice.") (quoting Malcolm C. Rich, Executive Director of the Chicago
Appleseed Fund for Justice, the research arm of the Chicago Council of Lawyers).
231 See Fla. Judges, Lawyers Warned on 'Friending,' Bos. GLOBE, Dec. 12, 2009, at 2;
Editorial, Our Take on ... Judges as BFFs, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Dec. 19, 2oo9, at Ai8; John
Schwartz, For Judges on Facebook, Friendship Has Limits, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. II, 2oo9, at A25;
Debra Cassens Weiss, Judges Shouldn't 'Friend Lawyers Who Appear Before Them, Opinion Says,
A.B.A.J.(Dec. 10, 2009, 8:22 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/articles/judges-shouldn't
friend-lawyers-whoappearbeforethemopinionsays; Ashby Jones, Why You Shouldn't Take
It Hard If a Judge Rejects Your Friend Request, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Dec. 9, 2oo9, 6:14 PM),
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Advisory Committee warned judges not to permit lawyers who appear in
their courts to be identified as "friends" on the judge's Facebook or other
Internet social networking page."a According to the Florida Committee,
a judge is disqualified from presiding over the cases of Internet "friends"
because the "friends" listing "conveys or permits others to convey the
impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge.""'
In other words, the Internet posting creates an appearance of partiality
automatically requiring the judge's disqualification from matters in which
the virtual "friend" appears as counsel. The opinion stands in stark contrast
to the general rule that a judge is not automatically disqualified from a
case in which a real friend appears. M As one court explained, "[flriendship
means many things, but it is rarely adequate grounds upon which to seek
recusal of a federal judge.""' And this is true even where the judge and
lawyer have a close relationship.3 6 For example, disqualification was not
required where an attorney frequently visited and vacationed with the
judge and characterized the relationship as "close friends.""
The Florida opinion ranks appearance over reality. Moreover, its
application is not likely to be restricted to Internet relationships. For if
the mere mention of a lawyer's name on a social networking page (a very
poor indicator of the true nature of a relationship3 ) creates an improper
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2oo9/12/o9/why-you-shouldnt-take-it-hard-if-a-judge-rejects-your-
friend-request.
232 Fla. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2009-20 (2009), available at http://www.
jud6.org/LegalCommunity/LegalPractice/opinions/jeacopinions/2oo9/2oo9-20.html. But see
Ethics Comm. of the Ky. Judiciary, Formal Op. JE-I 19 (20io), available at http://courts.ky.gov/
NR/rdonlyres/FA22C25i-1 9 87 -4 AD9-999B-A 3 267 9 4 CD62E/o/JEI I9.pdf (granting "quali-
fied" approval to list lawyers, social workers, law enforcement officials, and others as "friends"
on a judge's social networking page).
233 Fla. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2009-20 (2009).
234 Jeffrey Cole, Jilting the Judge: How to Make and Survive a Motion to Disqualify,
LITIGATION, Winter 2oo8, at 48, 52 ("(F]riendship with one party or its counsel, without more,
will not require recusal." (citation omitted)); John P. Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 56 YALE
L.J. 605, 622 (1947) (observing that "the overwhelming American practice is against disqualifi-
cation" on the basis of friendship); Timothy J. Goodson, Comment, Duck, Duck, Goose: Hunting
for Better Reausal Pracices in the United States Supreme Court in Light of Cheney v. United States
District Court, 84 N.C. L. REV. 181, 201 (2005) ("[F]riendship between a judge and a litigating
party has seldom been grounds for judicial disqualification." (citation omitted)).
235 Hadler v. Union Bank & Trust Co., 765 F. Supp. 976, 977 (S.D. Ind. 1991).
236 United States v. Olis, 571 F. Supp. 2d 777, 795 (S.D. Tex. zoo8) ("Many courts there-
fore have held that a judge need not disqualify himself just because a friend-even a close
friend-appears as a lawyer." (citations omitted)).
237 State v. Cannon, 254 S.W.3d 287, 307-o8 (Tenn. 2oo8); see also Cheney v. U.S. Dist.
Court, 541 U.S. 913, 924-25 (2004) (Scalia, J., memorandum denying motion for disqualifica-
tion) (describing how Supreme Court Justice Byron White went on a skiing trip with Attorney
General Robert Kennedy two weeks before the Attorney General argued a case before the
Court and while he was a defendant in two cases before the Court).
238 See Jones, supra note 231 ("I've friended friends, friends of friends, acquaintances,
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appearance, then more individualized and personal social contact such as a
dinner at an attorney's home, an invitation to a lawyer's wedding, a private
luncheon, or a poker night, as well as introducing a lawyer as "my friend,"
creates an even greater appearance of partiality.3 9 Once appearances become
the controlling concern, the actual nature of the personal relationship
becomes irrelevant. At that point, the only way to avoid the disqualifying
appearance is to end the relationship or keep it a secret.
The promotion of appearance over reality is not only alive and well in
the virtual world but also in the world of Supreme Court appointments.
Two issues that arose during the confirmation and installation of Justice
Sonia Sotomayor illustrate how meaningless appearances can detract from
more important issues in the judicial selection process.
b. Justice Sotomayor's Membership in the Belizean Grove
Detractors claimed that Justice Sotomayor's membership in a women's
networking group, the Belizean Grove, violated the federal judicial code's
prohibition against membership in an organization that practices invidious
discrimination on the basis of sex." Canon 2C of the Code of Conduct
for United States Judges bars membership in discriminatory organizations
because it "gives rise to perceptions that the judge's impartiality is
impaired." 41 An objective reading of federal Canon 2C and the ethics
advisory opinions interpreting similar state provisions clearly refutes the
detractors' claim.242 The Belizean Grove is obviously not the type of bigoted
work colleagues, people who claim to know me, people from my past I barely remember, and
people who probably requested my 'friendship' completely by mistake or through some sort
of elaborate spam ruse that I'm not smart enough to figure out. I routinely 'confirm' them
all.").
239 See, e.g., Ilya Somin, Florida Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee Forbids Facebook
"Friendships" Between Judges andLawyers, TIE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Dec. 15, 2009, 12:o8 AM),
http://volokh.com/20o912/15/florida-judicial-ethics-advisory-committee-forbids-facebook-
friendships-between-judges-and-lawyers ("[Tlhe Florida Committee's approach actually
treats Facebook friendship between lawyers and judges as a more serious breach of judicial
etiquette than a genuinely close friendship between the two. . . . I can't understand the
justification for a rule that bans essentially innocuous Facebook'friendships' but turns a blind
eye to real friendships."). But see Samuel V. Jones, Judge, Friends, and Facebook: An Essay on
the Ethics of Prohibition, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL Emics 505 (forthcoming Dec. 2010) (arguing that
the Florida Committee correctly interpreted the state's judicial code to prohibit judges from
permitting lawyers to "friend" a judge on electronic networking websites).
240 Tom LoBianco, Sotomayor Scrutinized for Ties to Women's Club: GOP Calls It
'Discriminatory,'WASH. TIMES, June 17, 2oo9, at Ai.
241 CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 2C Cmt. 2C (2009); see MODEL
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 3.6 cmt. 1 (2007).
242 See Cynthia Gray, Organizations that Practice Invidious Discrimination, JUDICIAL Emics
FORUM (June 30, 2009, 5:53 PM), http://judicialethicsforum.com/2oo9/o6/3o/organizations-
that-practice-invidious-discrimination (discussing judicial ethics opinions interpreting rules
which prohibit membership in groups practicing invidious discrimination).
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group banned by Canon 2C.There is simply no basis upon which to conclude
that membership in a women's business networking group foreshadows
partisan or biased court rulings. Is it reasonable to assume that a judge-
member of the Belizean Grove will be partial to female litigants or that the
group's mission will somehow leverage the judge's decisions? Of course
not.2 43 Justice Sotomayor's membership did not tarnish her impartiality any
more than Justices Ginsburg and O'Connor's less-publicized association
with the International Women's Forum.2 " Any lingering doubt about the
impact of club membership on Justice Sotomayor's impartiality disappears
after it is learned that the Belizean Grove was founded only because a men's
networking group, the Bohemian Club, would not allow women to join.2 45
But there is no arguing with appearances. Justice Sotomayor resigned from
the club to avoid distraction from the real issue-whether she possessed
the necessary judicial trait of actual impartiality.246
c. The Oaths of Office
Another appearances-driven distraction concerned the administration
of the oaths of office to Justice Sotomayor. New members of the Supreme
Court take two oaths. 47 The "judicial" oath is most often taken in a private
ceremony at the Supreme Court.248 The "constitutional" oath, required of
all executive and judicial officers, is usually administered in a televised
proceeding at the White House.2 49 In Justice Sotomayor's case, however,
243 If the Belizean club did practice invidious discrimination or membership in the
group created an appearance of impropriety, then Justice Sotomayor should have been disci-
plined for violating Canon 2C of the CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGEs while serving
as a judge of the court of appeals. See CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon
2C & cmt. 2C (2009) (prohibiting membership in any organization that practices invidious
discrimination on the basis of sex and prohibiting conduct which creates an appearance of
impropriety).
244 See LoBianco, supra note 240 ("The only two women to have sat on the court, Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg and former Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, were members of a women's
networking group, the International Women's Forum, but their memberships did not become
a major issue in their confirmation hearings.").
245 Id.
246 Nominee Quits Women's Group, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2oo9, at Aio (stating that Justice
Sotomayor resigned from the Belizean Grove to eliminate distractions from her "'qualifica-
tions and record"').
247 DENIS STEVEN RUTKUS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31989, SUPREME COURT
APPOINTMENT PROCESS: ROLES OF THE PRESIDENT, JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, AND SENATE 54
(2010).
248 Id.
249 Id.; see also Supreme Court Oath Taking Procedures, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES, http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/oath/oathsproceduresinfosheet2oo9.aspx (last
visited Sept. 7, 2010) ("[Slince 1986, each President who has appointed a Justice has hosted
an oath ceremony at the White House.").
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both oaths were administered at the Supreme Court, ostensibly to avoid
the perception that she was "'the President's appointee"'2 o and also as
a "'symbol of the Court's independence"' from the White House.s' But
moving the site of an installation ceremony can hardly be expected to
undo the fact that a Supreme Court Justice is the President's appointee.
It is hardly a secret that Presidents select nominees whose political and
ideological views mirror their own in the hope that the new Justice will
decide cases in a manner consistent with the President's views.zsa While
most Americans have no idea how many oaths a Justice takes or the
location of the administration of the oaths, the public is aware that the
nominee is chosen and actively supported by the President in an often
partisan confirmation process. And even assuming that the relocation of
Justice Sotomayor's oath-taking had some symbolic value, it was short
lived. Four days after the installation ceremonies, the White House hosted
a 200-person reception celebrating the appointment, where the President
thanked the Senate leaders and White House staffers for "our success."253
The attempt to achieve judicial legitimacy by manipulating appearances
is superficial and, at best, ineffective. Does anyone hold Justice Sotomayor
to be a more impartial jurist than Chief Justice Roberts because Sotomayor
took both oaths at the Court while Roberts took both oaths at the White
House? 54 If a President wishes to reinforce the concept ofjudicial autonomy,
the direct approach is superior. For instance, at the installation ceremonies,
wherever they are held, the President could directly broach the subject of
judicial impartiality. The President could simply emphasize that nothing is
expected from the new Justice, and the Constitution requires the Court to
affirm an executive's decisions when required by the facts and law and to
reverse an executive when an impartial review of the matter so dictates."5 5
250 See Ann M. Lousin, What They Should Have Asked Sotomayor, Cm. DAILY L. BULL.,
July 20, 2009, at 6 (stating that John Paul Stevens disliked White House oath taking because
it "suggest[s] to the American people that 'this is the President's appointee."'); see also Tony
Mauro, New Papers Give Insight into Rehnquist, FULTON CNTY. DAILY REP.,Aug. 24,2oog, at I (de-
scribing how the papers of the late Chief Justice William Rehnquist indicate that some mem-
bers of the Court preferred installation ceremonies to be conducted at the judicial building).
251 Tony Mauro, Sotomayor On Home Turf, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 10, 2oo9, at 17 (reporting
that "[a] White House source said President Barack Obama wanted the ceremony on judicial
ground as a 'symbol of the Court's independence"').
252 See GEORGE L. WATSON & JOHN A. STOOKEY, SHAPING AMERICA: THE POLITICS OF
SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS 58-59 (1995).
253 President Barack Obama, Remarks at a Reception Honoring Justice Sonia Sotomayor
(Aug. 12, zoo9) (available at 2009 WLNR 156oIo51) (transcribing the President's remarks
thanking Senators Patrick Leahy, Harry Reid, Charles E. Schumer, Kirston Gillibrand, and
others who "organized and mobilized" support for the Sotomayor confirmation effort).
254 See David G. Savage, Justice Sotomayor Sworn In, J. GAZETTE (Ft. Wayne, Ind.), Aug.
9, 2oo9, at A3 ("Roberts took both oaths at the White House from senior Justice John Paul
Stevens on Sept. 29, 2005.").
255 President Obama expressed this sentiment on the day the Senate confirmed Justice
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Moving rhetoric sometimes helps brand the American tradition of judicial
impartiality. Moving camera locations does not.- 6
III. PROMOTING ACTUAL IMPARTIALITY
The appearance of fairness is important, just not as important as
actual fairness. In order to restore impartiality in fact to its proper place
in the hierarchy of judicial values, it is necessary to proclaim impartiality
as the primary value of judicial ethics. This can be accomplished by (1)
acknowledging that partiality inflicts greater damage to litigants and the
judicial system than does the appearance of partiality, (2) amending codes
of judicial conduct to reflect the supremacy of actual impartiality, and (3)
publicly "branding" the judiciary as impartial. After declaring and branding
the supremacy of actual impartiality, that principle must be emphasized in
judicial disciplinary proceedings, judicial education programs, and judicial
selection, retention, and evaluation methods.
A. Declaring Impartiality More Important than the Appearance of Impartiality
Restoring impartiality to its proper place in the hierarchy of essential
values should start with a simple declaration that actual impartiality is more
important than the appearance of impartiality. This is not to depreciate
or diminish the significance of rules protecting appearances. No one is
suggesting that judicial conduct codes abandon provisions prohibiting ex
parte communications or eliminate rules prohibiting the acceptance of gifts
from attorneys even when not offered in return for a favor. Restricting a
judge's on-bench and off-bench conduct to avoid improper appearances is
a proper goal of codes of conduct, but it should not be the primary goal. It is
time to reestablish what was obvious in the nineteenth century: impartiality
in fact, not in appearance, is the fundamental value of judicial ethics."'
Sotomayor. See President Barack Obama, Remarks on Sotomayor Vote (Aug. 6, 2009) (available
at 2009 WLNR 15208954).
256 Apparently, many Presidents preferred to have at least one oath administered at the
White House in order to facilitate television coverage. See Tony Mauro, supra note 251 (report-
ing that in 1991, associate White House counsel advised an assistant to the Chief Justice that
the President wanted the oath ceremony conducted at the White House because the Court
did not allow cameras). The Sotomayor installation was the first time that the Supreme Court
permitted television cameras to record the administration of the oath. Supreme Court Oath
Firsts and Other Trivia, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATEs, http://www.supremecourt.
gov/about/oath/supremecourtoathfirstsandtrivia2oo9.aspx (last visited Sept. 7, 201o) (stating
that the administration of the oath to Justice Sotomayor on August 8, 2009, was "the first time
that an oath-taking ceremony at the Court was open to broadcast coverage").
257 Jeffery J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious RacialBias Affect TrialJudges?, 84 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1195, 1223 (2009) ("Moreover, impartiality is a prominent element in almost ev-
ery widely accepted definition of the judicial role." (citation omitted)); Mary Kreiner Ramirez,
Into the Twilight Zone: Informing Judicial Discretion in Federal Sentencing, 57 DRAKE L. REV. 591,
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This unequivocal declaration is necessary for the simple reason that actual
unfairness in judicial decision-making results in more insidious damage to
litigants and the judicial system than do the ill-advised acts of judges that
give a perception of bias. An example will illustrate the point.
Judge Timothy Ellender attended a Halloween party wearing an
Afro wig, a prison jump suit, handcuffs, and blackface 58 The Judiciary
Commission of Louisiana charged the judge with conduct "offensive,
derogatory, degrading, insulting, and demeaning towards African-
Americans," stating that his conduct "called into question Judge Ellender's
integrity and his ability to be fair and impartial towards African-Americans
who appear before his court as defendants in criminal proceedings.""' An
investigation of the judge's docket disclosed no sentencing disparity based
on race." Judge Ellender was suspended from office and ordered to enroll
in a racial sensitivity course.26 ' The demeaning and offensive exhibition
of racial stereotyping by the judge certainly damaged public confidence
in the judiciary and warranted the discipline imposed. However, an
inappropriate Halloween costume does not threaten judicial legitimacy to
the same extent as deciding a litigant's fate on the basis of skin color rather
than facts. This is true in part because actual bias results in real people
suffering unconscionable, unjustifiable, and illegitimate consequences. But
the elimination of actual partiality is also more important than improving
appearances because the former can be hidden. Appearances of partiality are
by definition in public view and therefore are identifiable and correctable,
or at least punishable.
As a first step in restoring actual impartiality to its rightful status, the
appearance of impartiality must be declared and treated as a "close second"
to the maintenance and promotion of impartiality in fact.262 Amending codes
of judicial conduct to reflect the importance of impartiality and "branding"
the judicial system with an impartiality theme will assist in that effort.
637 (2009) ("The duty to be fair and impartial is critical to judicial ethics." (citation omitted));
W. Bradley Wendel, Impatiality in Judicial Ethics: A JurisprudentialAnalysis, 22 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHICS & Pun. Po.'Y 305,305 (2oo8) ("The fundamental value in judicial ethics is impar-
tiality."); Richard Zorza, The Disconnect Between the Requirements ofJudicial Neutrality and Those of
the Appearance of Neutrality When Parties Appear Pro Se: Causes, Solutions, Recommendations, and
Implications, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 423, 426 (2004) ("It is a truism that there is no concept
more fundamental to the common law and United States legal systems thaln] judicial neutral-
ity. Without such neutrality, the entire legitimacy of the legal system, indeed its reason for
existence within the democratic experiment, fall." (citation omitted)).
258 In re Ellender, 2004-2123, p. 2 (La. 12/13/04); 889 So. 2d 225, 227.
259 Id. at p. 3, 889 SO. 2d at 228.
260 Id. at p. I 1, 889 SO. 2d at 232.
261 Id. at pp. 11-12, 889 SO. 2d at 233.
262 Stephen Gillers, "If Elected, I Promise [____J "-What Should Judicial Candidates Be
Allowedro Say?, 35 IND. L. REV. 725, 729 (2002) ("We all know that the appearance of justice is
either as important as justice or at least a close second.").
296 [Vol. 99
BIG JUDGE DAVIS
1. Acknowledging the Primacy ofActual Impartiality in Judicial Conduct Codes.-
The 1924 Canons treated impartiality as an essential value of the judicial
office.263 Maybe this was a remnant of the importance placed on the concept
in the nineteenth century. But by 1972, the importance of actual impartiality
had slipped to such an extent that the next two ABA Model Codes, while
implying that deciding cases required impartiality, never expressly informed
judges of that fact.2* Correcting this "oversight," Rule 2.2 of Canon 2 of
the 2007 Code instructs judges to "perform all duties of judicial office
fairly and impartially."s2 6 This declaration certainly cures the omission of
the two prior Model Codes but it does not go far enough. There is simply
no reason for the Code not to make a stronger statement regarding the
importance of impartiality. After all, impartiality is a fundamental principal
of our jurisprudence and "should carry a higher priority than the value,
important as it is, of projecting an appearance of impartiality."2 1 Indeed, the
Reporter's Explanation of Changes to the 2007 Code unequivocally states
that Canon Two's concern with actual impartiality and fairness is at the
"heart" of the new Code. 67 That statement, emphasizing the importance
of impartiality, belongs in the Code itself where judges will see it, not in
an ancillary, unofficial explanation of the Code. A new comment should be
added to Rule 2.2 of the 2007 Code advising judges that impartiality is the
cornerstone of the judicial function and that appearance, while important,
never replaces or supersedes the prime directive to decide disputes fairly.
2. Branding the Judiciary as Impartial.-Including a comment in judicial
codes stressing the primary importance of actual impartiality will not
suffice to enshrine the concept as the fundamental value of judicial ethics.
To accomplish that objective there must be more, including a "branding"
of our legal system as governed by the rule of law and judicial impartiality.
"Branding" is a concept usually applied in the context of promoting
commercial products or services. Fundamentally, branding is a shorthand
method of describing the quality or benefits of a particular product or service
263 CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 5 (1924) ("[A judge] should be temperate, atten-
tive, patient, [and] impartial....").
264 REPORTER'S EXPLANATION OF CHANGES: ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT,
2007, AMi. BAR. Ass'N 14 ("Although the duty to decide cases with impartiality was implicit in
numerous provisions in the former [19901 Code, it was not stated explicitly.").
265 Id. (explaining that Rule 2.2 of the 2007 Code corrects the oversight of the 1990
Code, which failed to explicitly direct judges to decide cases impartially); MODEL CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.2 (2007).
266 Dale A. Nance, Reliability and the Admissibility of Experts, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 191,
206 n-56 (2003).
267 REPORTER'S EXPLANATION OF CHANGES, supra note 264, at 12 ("This Canon [2] is at
the heart of the Rules, in that it governs core judicial functions.").
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to consumers or clients.zes A brand, usually expressed through a name, logo,
symbol, or slogan, must be "durable," "consistent," and "meaningful" to
potential customers. 69 Hopefully, it also "reflects the values of the people
who create the product."7 0
Successful commercial brandings are familiar to mostAmericans. "Coke"
("it's the real thing") has become synonymous with a cola drink. "You're in
good hands with Allstate" tells the marketplace all it needs to know about
the insurance company. Similarly, "the breakfast of champions" succinctly
explains why one should choose Wheaties over a competitor's product. But
branding is not restricted to profit-producing enterprises. Law schools have
been branded and re-branded.7 1 Law reviews attempt to develop better
name recognition and a stronger market share through branding.72 Judges
and courts also develop brands that influence individual and institutional
reputations.7 3
Recognizing the importance of branding, the United States Courts
retained an advertising company to develop and implement "a major
Branding strategy that will strive to create a new identity for the
Courts."274 The one-page press release announcing the award of the web-
development contract to DeepBlue stresses the prime directive of the
courts: to administer fair and impartial justice. The first paragraph of the
release describes the "federal judicial system's critical mission, which is
to ensure fairness and equal justice to all citizens."27s Five lines later, the
announcement reemphasizes that "[tihrough fair and impartial judgments,
the federal courts interpret and apply the law to resolve disputes."27 6 In
268 Kristin L. Rakowski, Branding as an Antidote to Indecency Regulation, 16 UCLA ENT. L.
REV. I, 16 (2009) ("Branding, at its core, is a means of providing notice to consumers about the
quality and characteristics of a product.").
269 Id. at 18.
270 Victor Fleischer, Brand New Deal: The Branding Effect of Corporate Deal Structures, 104
Mica. L. REV. 1581, 1583 (2oo6).
271 See, e.g., Case Study: U of M Law School Brand Strateg, EATON& AsSOCIATEs DESIGN
COMPANY, http://www.eanda.com/pages/case studies/umlaw brand.htm (last visited Oct.
9, 201) ("The University of Minnesota Law School is known internationally for superior
academic standards and its contribution to the law community. However, the Law School's
promotions did not effectively represent their prestige. Over the past two years, Eaton &
Associates has 're-branded' the school through an evolving system of materials design.").
272 Joshua D. Baker, Note, Relics or Relevant?; The Value of the Modern Law Review, iii W.
VA. L. REV. 919,936 (2009) (discussing the advantages of branding for law journals).
273 Michael E. Solimine, JudicialStrateflcation and the Reputations of the United States Courts
of Appeals, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1331, 1356 (2005) ("In the past two decades, the Seventh
Circuit has developed its own brand.").
274 Press Release, DeepBlue, U.S. Courts Selects DeepBlue for Branding and Website
Re-Development Project (Sept. 29, W08), available at http://www.deepblue.com/news.





effect, the news release brands impartiality as the distinguishing trait of the
American judicial system. This is the type of public declaration necessary
to reinvigorate the concept of actual impartiality. Fortunately, the theme
expressed in the press release has carried over as a prominent feature of the
United States Courts website designed by DeepBlue. The opening page
of the website advises visitors that federal courts "are an independent,
national judiciary providing fair and impartial justice within the jurisdiction
conferred by the Constitution and Congress." By contrast, no mention of
judicial impartiality appears on the opening screens of the websites for the
various circuits of the United States Courts of Appeals."'
Branding judicial impartiality through web page design and other
means serves an essential purpose beyond mere image building. Because
no express right to an impartial judge appears in the Constitution, the
traditional value placed on the neutral magistrate rests solely upon long-
standing and respected societal norms and traditions.7 9 But cultural norms
change over time, especially when ignored or taken for granted.8 0 As a result,
a "vigilant defense" of the bedrock principle of impartiality is essential
to its continued survival."' Without constant reinforcement, the treasured
principle could be morphed into a new norm: the appearance of impartiality.
277 UNITED STATES COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov (last visited Sept. 13, 2010).
278 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT, http://www.caI.uscourts.
gov (last visited Sept. 13, 2010); UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT,
http://www.caz.uscourts.gov (last visited Sept. 13, 2010); UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT, http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov (last visited Sept. 13, 2010); UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT, http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov (last visited
Sept. 13, 2010); UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT, http://www.ca5.
uscourts.gov (last visited Sept. 13, 2010); UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SixTH
CIRCUIT, http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov (last visited Sept. 13, 2010); UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT, http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov (last visited Sept. 13, 2010);
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT, http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov (last
visited Sept. 13, 2010); UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT, http://
www.cag.uscourts.gov (last visited Sept. 13, 2010); UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
ENTH CIRCUIT, http://www.caIo.uscourts.gov (last visited Sept. 13, 2010); UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT, http://www.call.uscourts.gov (last visited
Sept. 13, zoo); UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT,
http://cadc.uscourts.gov (last visited Sept. 13, 2010).
279 See David Pimentel, ReframingtheIndependencev. Accountability Debate: DefiningJudicial
Structure in Light of Judges' Courage and Integrity, 57 CLEV. ST. L. REV. I, 25 (2009) (suggesting
that "societal norms, customs, and expectations are among the most compelling determinants
of the American 'tradition of judicial independence'" (quoting Stephen B. Burbank, Judicial
Independence, JudicialAccountability, and Interbranch Relations, 95 GEO. L.J. 909, 913 (2007))).
28o See id. at 26.
281 CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, WHEN COURTS AND CONGRESS COLLIDE: THE STRUGGLE FOR
CONTROL OF AMERICA'S JUDICIAL SYSTEM 26o (2oo6) ("It would be a mistake to assume that
independence norms have been so deeply entrenched as to render either these episodic chal-




Even worse, the new cultural measure of a judge's worth could be defined
by how closely a judge is aligned with partisan interests or groups. In that
world, judges would be asked "not,'What does the law require?' but rather,
'What have you done for me lately?'"282 And unfortunately judges would
likely adjust to meet the new public expectation. Judges strive to achieve
what society values. Because impartiality is valued, judges work hard to
attain it.21 3 If impartiality is not properly incentivized, but instead replaced
by appearances or partisan allegiances, then judges will strive to live up to
the new norm. To prevent a new, undesirable brand from attaching itself to
the judiciary, the old time-tested brand of impartiality must be reaffirmed.
In addition to defining and publicizing the court's mission in terms of
an unbiased and fair judiciary, a greater effort must be made to incorporate
the importance of impartiality in judicial disciplinary proceedings; judicial
selection, retention, and evaluation procedures; and judicial education.
Reemphasizing impartiality in these areas will result in a stronger brand
and, most importantly, will produce more impartiality among our judges.
B. Judicial Discipline and Partiality
Each state maintains a disciplinary system tasked with investigating and
adjudicating allegations of judicial misconduct."" While these organizations
cannot graft a sense of impartiality onto the psyche of a judge, they can
remove a judge who lacks the trait. Even where a particular transgression
suggesting partiality is insufficient to warrant removal, a lesser disciplinary
sanction may cause a judge to purge a conscious bias, if not from a sense of
innate fairness, then from a fear of future prosecution."'
As a practical matter, most sanctions imposed by disciplinary
commissions do not include removal or suspension of the judge."' In 2008,
approximately eighty percent of judges found to be in violation of state
282 Burbank, supra note 279, at 916.
283 Shirley S. Abrahamson, Chief Justice, Wis. Supreme Court, Remarks Before the
American Bar Association Commission on Separation of Powers and Judicial Independence
(Dec. 13, 1996), in 12 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 69, 79 (1996) ("Because judicial indepen-
dence is valued in our society, judges strive to live up to this norm."); Pimentel, supra note
279, at 25 ("[Jludges aspire to high integrity because they live and work in a culture that prizes
it."); Stratos Pahis, Note, Corruption in Our Courts: What It Looks Like and Where It Is Hidden, II8
YALE L.J. l900, 1903 (2oo9) ("We expect judges to be honest because we establish institutions
that incentivize honesty.").
284 ALFINI ET AL., supra note 188, § 1.04.
285 Pimentel, supra note 279, at 26 ("[Tihe existence of a system of judicial discipline
does not generate integrity. Rather it is an environmental factor that may influence a judge in
her exercise of integrity, i.e. it may mitigate the harm when integrity is lacking .... ").
286 John 0. Haley, The Civil, Criminal and Disciplinary Liability of Judges, 54 AM. J. CoM P.
L. 281, 290 (2oo6) ("The most frequently imposed sanctions are relatively minor, such as
public censure or admonishment.").
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judicial conduct rules received sentences which allowed them to remain
on the bench."' Imposing a reprimand, censure, or admonishment is an
appropriate response to a minor transgression. Courtroom demonstrations
of partiality or favoritism, however, should not be accorded such lenient
treatment and warrant the permanent or temporary removal of the offending
judge.
Ticket fixing,2 providing a party favored treatment at the request
of a state senator,89 convicting a defendant before the defense rests,2 "
sentencing a pregnant defendant based on the judge's personal view of
abortion,2 91 and other similar displays of unfairness deserve a punishment
commensurate with the harm caused to the heart of the judicial system.
The New York Commission on Judicial Discipline properly considers
ticket fixing as sufficiently inconsistent with the role of a judge to warrant
removal even for a single transgression.z"z Also, in New York, "as a general
rule, intervention [by a judge] in a proceeding in another court should result
in removal." 93 On the other (more lenient) hand, in Mississippi, "[olften
the sanction for 'fixing' tickets is a public reprimand, fine and assessment
of the costs."2 W Under this counterproductive approach, a Mississippi judge
received a reprimand and five hundred dollar fine after committing an
"expansive degree of misconduct"29 s including finding thirteen defendants
not guilty without a trial at the request of others, including judges."*
Not surprisingly, undervaluing impartiality has resulted in ticket-fixing
becoming what one commentator has described as a "chronic problem in
Mississippi's . . . court system." 97
287 In 2oo8, twenty-six state judges lost their job as a result of actual or threatened
disciplinary proceedings. Of those twenty-six, nine judges were removed, one disbarred, one
permanently barred from judicial office, one found disabled, one permanently retired, two
suspended until the end of their terms, and eleven retired or resigned to avoid disciplinary
proceedings. One hundred and fifteen judges received other public sanctions. State Judicial
Discipline in 2oo8, JUD. CONDUCT REP., Winter 2oo9, at I.
288 E.g., In re Hearn, 542 SO. 2d 901, 902 (Miss. 1989); Kim Smith, JP Sought to Fix Son's
Ticket, ARIz. DAILY STAR, June 30, 20o, at A2; Charles Toutant, Jail Sought for Ex-Jersey City
Judge Who Admitted Fixing Traffic Tickets, 200 N.J. L.J. 701. See generally Cynthia Gray, Ticket-
Fixing, JUD. CONDUCT REP., Summer 2oo6, at I.
289 E.g., In re Eplin, 416 S.E.ad 248, 250 (W. Va. 1992).
290 E.g., In re Sulski, i Ill. Cts. Comm'n 22, 22 (Feb. 19, 1974).
291 E.g., Cleveland Bar Ass'n v. Cleary, 754 N.E.2d 235, 240 (Ohio zooI).
292 In tre Reedy, 475 N.E.2d 1262, 1263 (N.Y. 1985) ("Ticket-fixing is misconduct of
such gravity as to warrant removal, even if this matter were petitioner's only transgression."
(citations omitted)).
293 In re Edwards, 492 N.E.2d 124, 125 (N.Y 1986).
294 Miss. Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Bradford, o8-JP-o1989 -SCT (1 I2) (Miss.
2009), 18 So. 3d 251, 255.
295 In re Seal, 585 So. 2d 741, 746 (Miss. 1991).
296 Id. at 744.
297 Gray, supra note 288.
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To help ensure that an appropriately severe punishment accompanies
a demonstration of judicial bias, prejudice, or other form of partiality, each
jurisdiction should formally and specifically establish the lack of impartiality
as an aggravating factor in a disciplinary proceeding. Most states have not.
For the purpose of matching the severity of punishment with the degree
of the offense, states have enumerated aggravating and mitigating factors
to be applied in judicial disciplinary proceedings.298 Many jurisdictions'"
employ the following ten factors set forth by the Washington State Supreme
Court in In re Deming-3 0
(a) whether the judge's act was isolated or part of a pattern;
(b) the "nature, extent, and frequency" of the misconduct;
(c) whether the misconduct occurred in court;
(d) whether the acts occurred in the judge's official or private capacity;
(e) whether the judge acknowledged the wrongdoing;
(f) the judge's attempt to change the improper conduct;
(g) the length of the judge's service;
(h) prior complaints about the judge;
(i) the misconduct's impact on judicial integrity and public respect; and
(j) whether judicial status was exploited to satisfy "personal desires."o3 1
After an exhaustive study, the American Judicature Society condensed
the frequently employed disciplinary factors into the following short list:
(1) the nature of the judge's misconduct, (2) the extent of the misconduct,
(3) the judge's culpability, (4) the judge's response to the investigation and
disciplinary proceeding, and (5) the judge's reputation and record.3 0 2
No doubt the sentencing considerations set forth by the Deming court
and the American Judicature Society assist disciplinary bodies in making
difficult decisions. However, they suffer from a lack of specificity. For
example, the American Judicature Society's compilation of aggravating and
mitigating factors could be applied to the medical, accounting, or teaching
298 In re Coffey's Case, 949 A.2d 102, 114 (N.H. 2oo8) (citing In re Inquiry Concerning a
Judge, 788 P.2d 716, 724 (Alaska 1990)).
299 Multiple states have adopted the standards of In treDeming, 736 P2d 639 (Wash. 1987).
In re Inquiry Concerning McCormick, 639 N.W.2d 12, 16 (Iowa 2002) (citation omitted); In
re Morvant, 2009-0-0747, p. 6 n.8 (La. 6/26/09); 15 So. 3d 74, 78 n.8 (citation omitted); In re
Moore, 626 N.W.2d 374,386 & n.2o(Mich. 2001) (citation omitted); Judicial Conduct Comm'n
v. McGuire, 2oo4 ND 171, 133, 685 N.W.2d 748, 765 (citation omitted); In re Singletary, 967
A.2d 1094, 1102 (Pa. Ct. Jud. Discipline 2009); In a Disciplinary Proceedings Against Ziegler,
2oo8 WI 47,143,309 Wis. 2d, 253, 279-80,750 N.W.2d 710 (citation omitted); see Disciplinary
Counsel v. O'Neill, 103 Ohio St. 3d 204, 2oo4-OhiO-4704, 815 N.E.2d 286 (citations omitted);
see also ARIZ. CT. R. 19 (2010) (listing aggravating and mitigating factors based on Deming).
300 In re Deming, 736 P.2d 639 (Wash. 1987).
301 Id. at 659 (describing the factors as "non-exclusive").
302 CYNTHIA GRAY, AMERICAN JUDICATURE SocIETyA STUDY OF STATE JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE
SANCTIONs 8I-82 (2002). At least one state has adopted the American Judicature Society's
five-factor test. In r Coffey, 949 A.2d at I15.
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professions by substituting "doctor," or "accountant," or "teacher" each
time the word "judge" appears. Both sets of guidelines fail to hone in on
the fundamental purpose of the judicial system and the specific attributes
of judicial authority that justify society's special interest in judicial
performance and discipline.
Some states, while employing the general framework established
by Deming, add specific sentencing considerations related to the unique
and powerful position of the judge.303 In New Jersey, one factor defining
the gravity of an offense is "whether the misconduct constitutes the
impugn exercise of judicial power that evidences lack of independence
or impartiality." 3 This specific declaration, that transgressions impacting
the cornerstone of the judicial function will likely enhance a judge's
punishment, serves to alert the disciplinary body, the offending judge, all
other judges, and the public at large of the high value placed on protecting
judicial impartiality. Like New Jersey, every jurisdiction should broadcast in
precise terms that impartiality matters and that a violation of that signature
characteristic of American jurisprudence will result in an appropriately
augmented disciplinary response. Lesser infractions involving only an
appearance of partiality can continue to be treated more leniently.
Identifying a lack of impartiality as an aggravating sentencing factor
and applying that factor to enhance the punishment of offending judges
will directly foster impartiality in fact. It will also indirectly assist the cause
of impartiality by helping to brand the judicial system as valuing fairness.
C. Judicial Education
Notwithstanding the claim that "judges are notoriously difficult to
educate,"" judicial education is underutilized in promoting the goal of
actual impartiality. Continuing education classes are needed, first, simply
to remind judges of their core function as neutral magistrates. Featuring
judges who have demonstrated the ability to set aside personal predilections
and ignore public pressure in order to render impartial decisions is an ideal
format for this type of impartiality refresher course. But more importantly,
judges must be taught about the cognitive illusions that infect their
decisions and study methods to combat these subconscious biases.
303 See, e.g., In r Seaman, 627 A.2d ro6, 122 (N.J. 1993) (defining relevant factors to
include whether the judge's conduct involved dishonesty, corrupted the judicial process, evi-
denced a lack of independence or impartiality, or misused judicial authority (citations omit-
ted)); see also In re Mathesius, 9io A.2d 594, 611-12 (N.J. 2oo6) (applying the factors set out
in In re Seaman).
304 In re Seaman, 627 A.2d at 122 (citing In re Yaccarino, 502 A.2d 3 (N.J. 1988)).
3o5 Elisabeth McDonald, And Still We Must Talk About "Real Rape," 29 PACE L. REv. 349,
373 (2009) (reviewing JENNIFER TEMKIN & BARBARA KRAHE, SEXUAL ASSAULT AND THE JUSTICE
GAP: A QUESTION OF ATTITUDE (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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1. Reinforcing the Neutral Magistrate Principle through Judicial Education.-
Judicial training can reinforce the idea that impartiality is the mainstay
of an adversary system of justice. Virtually every rule governing the trial
process is born from a desire to ensure a fair hearing by a neutral tribunal.
"It is [the trial judge's] responsibility to have the trial conducted in a
manner which approaches an atmosphere of perfect impartiality . . . ."
Judges understand this duty, but the press of court business and the time
and energy devoted to processing overwhelming case loads necessitates a
periodic reminder of the very reason for a judicial officer's existence.
One logical format for an impartiality "refresher" course is the study
of judges who have exhibited the ability to set aside friendships, political
pressure, personal philosophies, and "public clamor" to decide matters
solely on the facts and law. Such judicial role models are not hard to find.
Some jurists demonstrate real courage. Frank Johnson, a federal judge
in Alabama from 1955 to 1979, suffered a cross burning in his yard, hundreds
of death threats, and the detonation of a bomb at his mother's home in
retaliation for his desegregation rulings."07 Judge W. Arthur Garrity's home
was under twenty-four-hour protection while he presided over the Boston
school desegregation case.30s Less well-known is David Brearley, former
Chief Justice of the New Jersey Supreme Court. During the American
War for Independence, Chief Justice Brearley struck down a state statute
prohibiting commercial intercourse with the British.3 09 As a result, the
enemy recovered property worth 29,428 pounds and thirteen shillings.310
The Chief Justice decided the case impartially even though, prior to his
court appointment, he had been arrested by the British and charged with
high treason while serving as a colonel in the Continental Army.311 More
recently, Probate Judge George Greer received the Sandra Day O'Connor
Jurist Award for courage in permitting the withdrawal of the feeding tube
3o6 State v. Iban C., 881 A.2d 1005, 1023 (Conn. 2005) (alteration in original) (quoting
State v. Gonzalez, 864 A.2d 847, 86o-6i (Conn. 2005)).
307 Dan T Carter, "Let Justice be Done": Public Passion and Judicial Courage in
Modern Alabama, Remarks at the Ray Rushton Distinguished Lecturer Series, in 28 CUMB.
L. REV. 553, 566-67 (1998); see also Christopher A. Bracey, Adjudication, Antisubordination, and
the Jazz Connection, 54 ALA. L. REV. 853, 871 (2003) ("The Civil Rights era was, in many ways,
an era defined by judicial courage.").
3o8 Michael S. Greco, Immediate-Past President, Am. Bar Ass'n, Judicial Courage in
the 2ISt Century 5 (June 13, 2007), available at http://www.klgates.com/files/Publication/
f696f6o -8d62-45o-85ac-i6a626oibbo4/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/b259f9f7-
8b6f-4e5o-96cf-2I7f77a5f349/GrecoMADistrictCourt_Cono61 3 o7.pdf.
309 United States v. Jepson, 9o F. Supp. 983,985-87 (D.N.J. i95o) (discussing Holmes v.
Walton, 9 N.J.L. 444 (N.J. 1780)).
310 Id. at 985-86.
311 JOSEPH C. MORTON, SHAPERS OF THE GREAT DEBATE AT THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION OF 1787: A BIOGRAPHicAL DICTIONARY 39-40 (2oo6).
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from a woman in a permanent vegetative state."'
Other judges in equally precarious, but less physically threatening,
situations have disregarded personal loyalties and debts of gratitude. Two of
President Truman's Supreme Court appointees, Justices Burton and Clark,
were his personal friends and were expected to vote to uphold his seizure of
the steel mills during the Korean War.1 Instead, both men concurred with
the majority in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, finding the takeover
unconstitutional. 314 In a similar vein of independence, a unanimous Court
rejected President Nixon's privilege claim regarding White House tape
recordings in United States v. Nixon."' Chief Justice Burger and two of the
other Nixon appointees joined in the majority opinion, which eventually
resulted in the President's resignation.31 6
Texas v. Johnson 31 illustrates the indispensible and widespread ability
of judges to disregard personal convictions in favor of following the law. In
that case, Justice Scalia provided the decisive fifth vote to invalidate a state
statute criminalizing flag-burning, notwithstanding his personal dislike of
flag-burners.31 1 Justice Scalia left no doubt about his personal view of flag
desecration when he told a reporter, "I don't like people who burn the
American flag, and if I were king, I would put them in jail." 3 19
It is not only high-profile judges who exemplify the gold standard of
impartiality. Virtually every judge has ruled against a friend, suppressed
essential evidence, acquitted an alleged sex offender, granted probation to
a defendant considered by most to be unworthy of the privilege, or ruled
against public officials who would be helpful in the judge's next retention
312 Press Release, American College of Trial Lawyers, American College of Trial
Lawyers Honors Judge George W. Greer with Prestigious Sandra Day O'Connor Jurist Award
(Mar. 24, 2oo8), available at http://www.actl.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&CONT
ENTID=3 5 4 9 &TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm. Judge Greer, the trial judge in Bush
v. Schiavo, 885 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 2004), received death threats and was also compelled to resign
from his church. Barbara A. Noah, The Role of Religion in the Schiavo Controversy, 6 Hous. J.
HEALTH L. & Poi'Y 319,344 (2oo6) (citation omitted).
313 William H. Rehnquist, Constitutional Law and Public Opinion, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
751, 753 n.3 (1987). Democratic Presidents appointed all nine judges. Id. at 753.
314 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,587 (1952).
315 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 714 (1974). Justice Rehnquist did not partici-
pate in the decision. Id. at 683.
316 The Nixon appointees were Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Powell,
and Rehnquist. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Judicial Independence, 20 U. HAW. L. REV.
603, 604 (1998).
317 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
318 Karen Lee Torre, Norm Pattis's New Dopey Word, CONN. L. TRIB., Dec. 22, 2008, at 35
(stating that Justice Scalia provided the "tipping vote" producing an outcome that he "person-
ally detested").
319 Robert Barnes, With a Book Coming Out, Scalia Is All Talk-Even with the Media, WAsH.
PosT, Apr. io, 2oo8, at A4.
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campaign. 32 0 Everyday acts by ordinary judges provide an equally effective
teaching tool in reinforcing the goal of judicial neutrality.
But merely mandating education classes that highlight examples of
judicial courage will not alone maintain and improve courtroom impartiality.
What is needed is judicial education on a deeper level: the subconscious
aspects of judging.
2. Cognitive Illusions.-Few judges understand the complicated mental
processes involved in receiving and evaluating information during the
decision-making process. Judges are simply unaware of how heuristics
and other subconscious biases and stereotypes influence outcomes. It is
education in these matters, foreign to most judges, that holds the greatest
hope for improving judicial impartiality.
a. Decision-Making Heuristics
Heuristics are rules of thumb that we all use and misuse in making
judgments. Understanding the subconscious operation of heuristic thought
is especially vital for those entrusted by the government to make impartial
decisions for others.
One such shortcut method of reasoning, known as the representativeness
heuristic, can especially taint judicial decision-making because it relies
on a process honored by all lawyers: reasoning by analogy."' In its pure
form, the representativeness heuristic estimates the frequency of an event
by comparing it to a prototype or a superficially similar known event."'
For example, if you were asked whether a short, slim person who reads
poetry was more likely an Ivy League classics professor or a truck driver,
320 Cf Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 798 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing) ("[Clountless judges in countless cases routinely make rulings that are unpopular and
surely disliked by at least [fifty] percent of the litigants who appear before them. It is equally
common for them to enforce rules that they think unwise, or that are contrary to their personal
predilections."); Greco, supra note 308, at 4 ("Day in and day out, judges in our country-over
25,000 in the state court system alone-hear thousands of cases. And each day courageous
judges ... uphold the Rule of Law and administer justice, even when the law itself may be
unpopular, the facts and players shock the public, the case is notorious, or personal harm is a
possibility.").
321 See Morell E. Mullins, Sr., Tools, NotRules: The HeuristicNature ofStatutory Interpretation,
30 J. LEGIS. 1, 51 (2003) ("This [representativeness] heuristic should sound familiar to lawyers
and legal academics, because we have been brain-washed since law school on the fine art of
reasoning (and misleading) by analogies, a device rooted in similarities and differences." (cita-
tion omitted)).
322 JOHN B. BEST, COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 374 (5th ed. 1999); Gregory Scott Crespi, The
Mid-Life Crisis of the Law and Economics Movement: Confronting the Problems of Nonfalsifiability
and Normative Bias, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 231, 249 (1991). Crespi defines the representa-
tiveness heuristic as "reliance upon stereotypical characterizations to the point of insensitivity
to relevant prior probabilities and sample sizes." Id. (citation omitted).
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you might conclude that the individual was more likely a professor."' This
is because the description of the individual is more representative of the
stereotypical image of a scholar than the prototype truck driver. 1 4 But
this conclusion is almost certainly wrong, considering the small number
of classics professors at Ivy League schools and the large number of truck
drivers. 32 5 Other decision-making heuristics directly related to the judging
process, 3 6 yet little understood by judges, include anchoring (relying
on the first available information to the exclusion of more relevant data
obtained later);" framing (allowing the way in which a question is asked
to influence our reasoning);" hindsight bias (overstating the predictability
of past events);2 and confirmation bias (seeking information that may
confirm what is expected to be true).330
Lawyers might suggest that the egocentric bias (overestimating one's
abilities)... is the heuristic most likely to undermine a judge's reasoning
process. Judge David Davis probably suffered from this cognitive defect
since it was no secret that his "self-appreciation was great." 3  Judicial
susceptibility to the egocentric bias was measured recently during a
conference of administrative law judges. Judges attending the conference
were asked to compare themselves to other attendees on their ability
to (1) judge a witness's credibility, (2) "avoid bias," and (3) "facilitate
settlements." 3 3 With regard to assessing witness credibility, 83.3% of the
administrative judges placed themselves in the top half of attendees.
323 This illustration is presented in DAVID G. MYERS, PSYCHOLOGY 278-79 (1986).
324 Id. at 278.
325 Id. at 278-79.
326 See United States ex rel. Bagley v. TRW, Inc., 204 F.R.D. 170, 18o (C.D. Cal. 2001)
(recognizing the misleading results caused by the hindsight bias); Chris Guthrie, Jeffery J.
Rachlinski &AndrewJ. Wistrich, Inside theludicialMind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 778 (2001)
(finding that framing, anchoring, hindsight, representativeness, and egocentric biases signifi-
cantly influence judicial decision making); Jeffery J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory
ofJudging in Hindsight, 65 U. CmI. L. REV. 571, 572 (1998) (describing how the hindsight bias
can affect the application of judicial standards such as foreseeability).
327 See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioraism Seriously: The Problem of
Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 63o, 667 (1999) (describing the concept of anchoring).
328 BEST, supra note 322, at 376; see also Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situational
Character: A Critical Realist Perspective on the Human Animal, 93 GEO. L.J. 1, 42 (2004) ("[Tlhe
way in which an issue is presented to us significantly influences how we perceive it.").
329 Jeffery J. Rachlinski, The Uncertain Psychological Casefor Paternalism, 97 Nw. U. L. REV.
I165, 1171-72 (2003).
330 BEST, supra note 322, at 377.
331 See Jeffery J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges, 84
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1228 (2oo9) ("Iludges are inclined to make the same sorts of fa-
vorable assumptions about their own abilities that non-judges do." (citation omitted)).
332 See WHITNEY, supra note 23, at 75.
333 Chris Guthrie, Jeffery J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, The "Hidden Judiciary": An
Empirical Examination of Executive Branch Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 1477, 1519 (2009).
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Similarly, 86.2% of the judges placed themselves in the upper half in
their ability to promote settlements. And to no one's surprise, 97.2% rated
themselves in the top half in the ability to avoid bias."
Because heuristics influence how judges process information, misuse of
these reasoning shortcuts can adversely affect every aspect of a judge's job,
including sentencing decisions;"' settlement negotiations; 3 6 the ability
to accurately recall facts, 3  disregard suppressed evidence,3  or interpret
statutes;3 3 9 and rulings on motionsj0 discovery disputes,3' and evidentiary
objections.342
Incorporating the subject of heuristics into judicial education programs
will assist judges in recognizing and combating these common barriers
to well-reasoned, objective judgments, thereby enhancing the actual
impartiality of the courts.
b. Gender, Racial, Ethnic, and Other Stereotypes
Cognitive illusions most threaten judicial impartiality when they result
in unconscious biases and stereotypes involving attorneys, witnesses, or
litigants. Because courts acknowledge that "[a] growing body of social
science recognizes the persuasiveness of unconscious racial and ethnic
stereotyping and group bias,"343 training strategies have been developed to
deal with racial, ethnic, gender, and sexual orientation forms of implicit bias.
334 Id.
335 See Guthrie et al., supra note 326, at 794 (discussing the application of the anchoring
heuristic in sentencing decisions).
336 Robert G. Bone, Who Decides? A Critical Look at Procedural Discretion, 28 CARDozo L.
REV. 1961, 1988-89 (2007) (demonstrating that biases impact settlement negotiations).
337 See Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking, and
Misremembering, 57 DUKE L.J. 345, 353 n.23 (2007).
338 See Andrew J. Wistrich, Chris Guthrie & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Can Judges Ignore
Inadmissible Information? The Difficuhy of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251,
1262-63 (2005).
339 See Mullins, supra note 321, at 53 ("This bias or risk of error can be found in the
implementation of law generally and is associated with statutory interpretation heuristics as
well as in statutes themselves." (citation omitted)).
340 See Bone, supra note 336, at 1988-89 (referring to the effect of cognitive bias on
motions for summary judgment); Daniel S. Medwed, California Dreaming? The Golden State's
Restless Approach to Newly Discovered Evidence of Innocence, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1437, 1472-75
(2007) (arguing that "status quo" bias and "egocentric bias" limit a judge's ability to correctly
assess a post-trial claim of "newly discovered evidence" (citations omitted)).
341 See Bone, supra note 336, at 1988 (suggesting that heuristics influence discovery
rulings).
342 See William Wesley Patton, To Err Is Human, To Forgive, Often Unjust: Harmless Error
Analysis in ChildAbuseDependency Proceedings, 13 U.C. DAVIs J.JuV. L. & Po[' 99, lo3 n.io (2009)
("Judges' egocentric biases affect almost every aspect of trials .... " (citation omitted)).
343 Chin v. Runnels, 343 F. Supp. 2d 891, 906 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (citations omitted).
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To be most effective, these strategies must address subconscious biases and
not merely the overt manifestation of those biases. Too often sensitivity
training consists simply of a "do's and don'ts" checklist instructing judges
to avoid demeaning or stereotypical comments.
For example, a handbook on Gender Equality in the Courts: A Guide for
All New Mexico State and Federal Courts warns judges not to (1) use terms
of endearment like "honey" or "dear" when addressing female lawyers,
(2) make sexual jokes, or (3) comment on physical appearances."5 On the
"do's" side of the checklist, the New Mexico Handbook suggests thatjudges
treat everyone with courtesy and respect and address women and men
with "gender neutral terms" and use titles such as Mr. or Ms. 46 Similarly,
California's GuidelinesforJudicial Officers:AvoidingtheAppearance ofBias, does
just that: the handbook counsels judges to steer clear of bad appearances
by refraining from addressing female lawyers by their first names or
commenting on an attorney's physical appearance" 7 Pennsylvania judges
are directed not to use "sweetie," "honey," "dear," "son," "boy," or "young
lady," or comment on a person's appearance, dress, hairstyle, body parts,
pregnancy, skin color, ethnicity, or disability." Jurists in the Keystone State
are further cautioned against making derogatory comments, stereotypical
remarks, or assumptions concerning a "person's profession or agenda."349
Although essential, each of these protocols deals with the appearance or
manifestation of bias, not the actual underlying bias.
Fortunately, judicial training regimes have been created to address
unconscious biases. The University ofNorth Carolina School ofGovernment
sponsors one of the best. "Fairness in the Courts"s 0 explains the impact of
implicit associations, stereotypical thinking, and heuristics on the decision-
making process and skillfully suggests methods to combat racial, ethnic,
and other forms of implicit bias that inhibit impartial courtroom judgments.
344 Evan R. Seamone, Understanding the Person Beneath the Robe: Practical Methods for
Neutralizing Harmful Judicial Biases, 42 WILLAMETTE L. REV. I, 18-22 (2oo6); id. at 18 (criticiz-
ing "[t]he checklist method to judicial debiasing").
345 COMM. ON WOMENAND THE LEGAL PROFESSION, STATE BAR OF N.M., GENDER EQUALITY
IN THE COURTS: A GUIDE FOR ALL NEW MEXICO STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 7-8 (2000), avail-
able at http://www.nmbar.org/attorneys/lawpubs/genderequality.pdf.
346 Id. at 7.
347 JUDICIAL COUNCIL ADVISORY COMM. ON ACCESS AND FAIRNESS, GUIDELINES FOR
JUDICIAL OFFICERS: AVOIDING THE APPEARANCE OF BIAS II, 15 (1996), available at http://www.
courtinfo.ca.gov/programs/access/documents/genderb.pdf.
348 PENNSYLVANIA INTERBRANCH COMM'N FOR GENDER, RACIAL & ETHNIC FAIRNESS,
ACHIEVING FAIRNESS THROUGH BIAS-FREE BEHAVIOR: A POCKET GUIDE FOR THE PENNSYLVANIA
COURTS ID (2009), available at http://www.co.lancaster.pa.us/courts/lib/courts/UJSNon-
DiscriminationandEEOolicyAchieving.FarinessPamphlet.pdf.
349 Id. at I I.
350 James C. Drennan, Albert Coates Professor of Public Law and Government,




Similarly, a National Judicial College workshop explores implicit bias and
its impact on the judging process.3 11 Illinois also created a course devoted
in part to the impact of implicit bias and heuristics in judicial decision-
making."' Judge Mark W. Bennett has prepared presentations and written
materials for judges explaining implicit bias."5
The ability to recognize and combat actual bias is more important
than a judge's ability to avoid the appearance of bias. Even accepting for a
moment the popular notion that the two concepts are of equal importance,
logic dictates that both should receive equal time in education programs.
But they do not. Most judicial ethics instruction is based on judicial codes,
which, in the main, focus on preventing bad appearances.'- The more
important instruction on cognitive illusions"55 should be "mainstreamed"
instead of being given "short-shrift" in judicial education. 36 This is easily
accomplished because many states, as part of their mandatory continuing
judicial education program,357 require that judges complete courses covering
specific subject matter such as judicial ethics, 58 capital litigation 359 and
351 Mary Kreiner Ramirez, Into the Twilight Zone: Informing Judicial Discretion in Federal
Sentencing, 57 DRAKE L. REV. 591, 630-32 (2009) (describing the workshop's implicit bias cur-
riculum); see also Kathleen Sikora, Social Cognition: Solutions for Unintended Bias, NASJE NEWS,
Fall 2oo6, at 32, 33, available at http://nasje.org/news/newslettero6o4/confi8.htm (summariz-
ing the National Judicial College's course content).
352 See Course Materials, Judicial Decision Making in a Democratic Society, Illinois
Judicial Conference (June 15-19, 2009) (on file with author).
353 Mark W. Bennett, Essay, Unraveling the Gordian Knot of Implicit Bias in Jury Selection:
The Problems of Judge-Dominated Voir Dire, the Failed Promise of Batson, and Proposed Solutions,
4 HARv. L. & PoI'y REV. 149, 169 (20o) (describing the literature on implicit bias and its ap-
plication to jury selection);see also JERRY KANG, IMPLICIT BIAs: A PRIMER FOR COURTS (2009),
available at http://new.abanet.org/sections/criminaljustice/PublicDocuments/unit%203%20
kang.pdf.
354 See supra Part II.B.2-5.
355 By "more important" I mean primacy not only in the sense that reality should trump
perception, but also in the sense that it is difficult to understand the complexities of cognitive
science without expert assistance. By contrast, the rules protecting appearances (e.g., rules
advising judges not to solicit money for charities, donate money to political candidates, or
accept gifts from lawyers) can largely be self-taught.
356 Ramirez, supra note 351, at 62 1, 636.
357 See, e.g., CAL. R. CT. 10-462(d) (2010) (setting minimum education requirements for
trial judges at thirty hours every three years); FLA. R. JUD. ADMIN. 2.32o(b)(2) (2010) (requiring
thirty hours of instruction every three years); N.Y. CT. R. § 17.3 (2oo) (requiring judges to at-
tend at least twenty-four hours of instruction every two years); see also Rachlinski et aL, supra
note 257, at 1228 ("Judicial education is common these days....").
358 See, e.g., FLA. R. JUD. ADMIN. 2.32o(b)(2) (2010) (requiring two hours of judicial ethics
training every three years); OmIo Gov. JUD. R. IV § 2(C) (20o) (requiring at least two hours of
instruction relating to judicial ethics and professionalism every two years).
359 See, e.g., CAL. R. CT. Io.469(d) (2oo) (recommending that judges assigned to hear
capital cases attend a comprehensive education program); ILL. Sup. CT. R. 43 (zolo) (requiring
judges who preside over death penalty cases to attend capital litigation seminars).
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domestic violence."w Cognitive bias, which influences every aspect of a
judge's work, must be added to the mandated areas of judicial training.
D. The Selection, Retention, and Evaluation of Judges
The processes by which judges are chosen, retained in office, and
evaluated provide a ready-made, but often overlooked, avenue for insuring
and promoting judicial impartiality.
1. Judicial Selection.-No shortage of opinion exists on which method of
judicial selection produces the most impartial judges.16 ' As a delegate to the
1847 Illinois Constitutional Convention, David Davis vehemently argued
for the popular election of state judges in order to prevent the corrupting
influence caused by legislative appointment of the judiciary."z Delegate
Davis also believed that elections would improve the federal bench
because, unlike the president, the people "would have chosen judges,
instead of broken down politicians." 6 Today, Wisconsin Supreme Court
Chief Justice Shirley Abramson agrees that the election of judges is the
preferred selection method, at least in her state."* On the other side of the
ballot box, Justice John Paul Stevens considers that "the very practice of
electing judges is unwise," 6 ' and Justice Sandra Day O'Connor remarked
that if Minnesota "has a problem with judicial impartiality, it is largely
one the State brought upon itself by continuing the practice of popularly
360 See, e.g., N.Y. CT. R. § 17.4(a) (201o) (requiring judges dealing with criminal or family
matters to attend a program addressing domestic violence); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-2ob()-(3)
(West 2oo) (requiring the New Jersey Administrative Office of the Courts to develop and
implement judicial training concerning the impact and dynamics of domestic violence).
361 See Seth Anderson, Opening Statement of Moderator, Anatomy of a Merit Selection
Victory (Feb. 13, 2009), in 93 JUDICATURE 6, 6 (2009) ("The debate over the best methods of
selecting judges really is as old as the republic.").
362 THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES OF 1847, at 461-62 (Arthur Charles Cole ed., 1919).
Davis may have held a different opinion had his own Whig Party, rather than the Democrats,
controlled the Illinois legislature. See also Bruce I. Petrie, Sr., Political Patronage in Ohio:
Governor Taft's Judicial Appointees, 77 U. CIN. L. REv. 645, 645 (2008) (criticizing the fact that
every judicial officer appointed by the governor belonged to the same political party (citation
omitted)).
363 TIE CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATES OF 1847, supra note 362, at 462.
364 Abrahamson, supra note 283, at 76; see also CHRIS W. BONNEAU & MELINDA GANN
HALL, IN DEFENSE OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 139 (2oo9); Tony Mauro, On Judicial Elections and
Judicial Recusal, THE BLT THE BLOG OF LEGAL TIMES (Oct. 12, 2009, 11:3o AM), http://legal-
times.typepad.com/blt/2009/Io/on-judicial-elections-and-judicial-recusal.html (reporting that
Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justices Seamus McCaffery and Debra Todd presented the case
for judicial elections before a meeting of the American Academy of Appellate Lawyers).





Each side of the debate offers its own set of empirical data. Support for
the argument that elected judges bring a greater sense of impartiality to
the bench can be found in a recent study purportedly showing that merit-
selected judges are more likely to suffer discipline for misconduct evidencing
a "'lack of impartiality"' than judges selected by other means. 67 In further
support of their position, election proponents cite a poll commissioned by
the ABA finding that seventy-five percent of the respondents considered
elected judges "more fair and impartial" than appointed judges.3 6
Adherents to the theory that appointed judges are less partisan cite
their own polling data demonstrating the public's dislike of campaign
contributions in judicial races. According to one study, sixty-nine percent of
Americans are convinced that raising campaign funds influences a judge's
courtroom decisions to a "great" or "moderate" extent.3 6' The percentage
believing that contributions influence decisions is even higher among
leaders in the business community.3 0 Advocates of an appointed judiciary
also flaunt a set of empirical studies arguably demonstrating that elected
judges tailor their rulings to secure votes and campaign contributions."'
366 Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 792 (2002) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring).
367 Jona Goldschmide et al., The Relationship Between Method of Judicial Selection and
Judicial Misconduct, 18 WIDENER L.J. 455, 475 (2oo9). But see Malia Reddick, Judging the
Quality of Judicial Selection Methods: Merit Selection, Elections, and Judicial Discipline 6 (Am.
Judicature Soc'y, White Paper June 15, 20o0), available at http://www.ajs.org/selection/docs/
JudgingQualityJudSelectMethods.pdf (concluding that a review of disciplinary actions in
nine states "support[s] the hypothesis that merit-selected judges are disciplined less often
than elected judges.").
368 James Bopp, Jr. & Josiah Neeley, How Not to Reform Judicial Elections: Davis, White,
and the Future ofJudicial Campaign Financing, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 195, 199 (2oo8).
369 KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON, THE ANNENBERG PUBLIC POLICY CENTER, PUBLIC
UNDERSTANDING OF AND SUPPORT FOR THE COURTS: 2007 ANNENBERG PUBLIC POLICY
CENTER JUDICIAL SURVEY RESULTS (2007), http://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/
Downloads/2ooo0I7JudicialSurvey/Judicial-FindingsI-17-2007.pdf; accord Deborah
Goldberg, Public Funding of Judicial Elections: The Roles of Judges and the Rules of Campaign
Finance, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 95, 97 n. I 1(2003) ("Poll after poll demonstrates the public's belief
that money contributed to candidates for the bench affects judicial decision-making.").
370 CHRISTIAN W. PECK, ZOGBY INT'L, ArrITUDES AND VIEWS OF AMERICAN BUSINESS
LEADERS ON STATE JUDICIAL ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO JUDGES 4 (2007),
available at http://www.faircourts.org/media/cms/CEDFINAL-repor-onsI4MAYo7-
BED4DF4955Boi.pdf (finding that 79% of business leaders believe that campaign contribu-
tions impact judicial decisions).
371 Joanna M. Shepherd, Money, Politics, and Impartial Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 623, 625
(2009) (purporting to provide "empirical evidence that elected state supreme court judges
routinely adjust their rulings to attract votes and campaign money"); see also Aman McLeod,
Bidding for Justice: A Case Study About the Effect of Campaign Contributions on Judicial Decision-
Making, 85 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 385,400 (2oo8) (suggesting that a Michigan Supreme Court
Justice is more likely to vote for a parry if the parry's lawyers have made a substantially larger
campaign contribution to the justice than the opposing party's lawyers).
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Due to conflicting polls and studies, the debate over judicial selection
remains driven by intuition and ideology rather than empiricism. 3 2 Without
clear-cut evidence as to which selection method produces the most
impartial judges, there is no compelling argument for choosing one system
over the other. And even if there were, the ideological component of the
debate might prevent wholesale adoption of the empirically proven "'best"'
method of selection.3 13 As a result, strategies must be developed to ensure
that impartial judges are chosen regardless of the selection method.
a. Emphasizing Impartiality in the Judicial Appointment Process
Judicial nominating commissions exist in thirty-three states and the
District of Columbia.114 The commissions vary in duties, composition, and
procedures, but each has the responsibility to review and evaluate applicants
for state judicial posts and recommend a group of the applicants to the
appointing authority."' Commission members are usually provided with a
set of criteria upon which to assess the candidates. Obviously, the criteria
should identify the traits of a good judge and emphasize the nonnegotiable
quality of impartiality. Inexplicably, some jurisdictions totally omit the
concept of fairness from their stated selection standards. For example,
Indiana directs that each member of the state's judicial nominating
commission evaluate judicial candidates on the following considerations:
(1) "legal education," (2) "legal writings," (3) reputation and experience as
a lawyer or judge, (4) health, (5) "financial interests," (6) public service and
efforts to improve the administration of justice, and (7) "other pertinent
information." 76
The American Bar Association suggests five selection criteria: (1)
"experience," (2) "integrity," (3) "professional competence," (4) "judicial
temperament," and (5) "service to the law" and administration of justice.3 7
372 See Richard B. Saphire & Paul Moke, The Ideologies of Judicial Selection: Empiricism
and the Transformation of the Judicial Selection Debate, 39 U. TOL. L. REV. 551, 554 (2oo8)
("[Tihe debate over judicial selection is inherently ideological in nature, such that no empiri-
cal transformation of the debate has yet taken place.").
373 Id. at 589-
374 AM. JUDICATURE Soc'Y, JUDICIAL MERIT SELECTION: CURRENT STATUS tbl.z
(20o0), available at http://www.judicialselection.us/uploads/Documents/Judicial-Merit
Charts oFC20225EC6C2.pdf.
375 See Methods of Judicial Selection: Judicial Nominating Commissions, AM. JUDICATURE
Soc'v, http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial-selection/methods/judicial-nominating-com-
missions.cfm?state= (last visited Oct. 9, 2010) (summarizing the rules governing the operation
of each state judicial nominating commission).
376 IND. CODE ANN. § 33-27-3-2 (LexisNexis 2004).
377 COMM'N ON STATE JUDICIAL SELECTION STANDARDS, AM. BAR Ass'N, STANDARDS ON




While impartiality is not listed, judicial temperament is defined to include
"a commitment to equal justice under law, freedom from bias, ability to
decide issues according to law, courtesy and civility, open-mindedness and
compassion."" But if impartiality lies at the heart of our judicial system,
then it deserves specific recognition as an ABA selection criterion. This is
especially true because some states that pattern their selection standards
after the ABA recommendations do not include the ABA's definition of
judicial temperament.7 9 Emphasizing impartiality in selection criteria is
vital because it reminds the public and nominating commission members
of this essential trait 80 and focuses the selection process on candidates who
exhibit it.381
The concept of impartiality is likewise short-changed in the application
forms used for judicial candidates. Illustrative is the very thorough
Application for Nomination to Judicial Office used in Arizona. 8 1 It contains
seventy-one questions, but not a single inquiry mentions impartiality."
Adding a question requiring each candidate to explain why he or she could
be relied upon to exercise judicial power without bias or favoritism, and
independent of political or other irrelevant considerations, would help
fortify public trust in the selection process.3  This type of question also
378 Id.
379 For example, the Utah Manual of Proceduresfor.ustice Court Nominating Commissions
defines judicial temperament to include "common sense, compassion, decisiveness, firmness,
humility, open-mindedness, patience, tact and understanding." UTAH STATE COURTS, MANUAL
OF PROCEDURES FOR JUSTICE COURT NOMINATING COMMISSIONS 19 (20IO), available at http://
www.utcourts.gov/resources/rules/ucja/append/anomcom/appa.pdf. The Manual also sug-
gests that in addition to the ABA selection guidelines the commission members "may wish to
consider" a candidate's impartiality. Id. at 21.
38o This is especially important for judicial screening committees that include non-at-
torney members. See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. 6, H§ 36, 41 (requiring five attorneys and ten non-
attorneys on judicial nominating commissions).
381 See Joseph A. Colquitt, Rethinking Judicial Nominating Commissions: Independence,
Accountability, and Public Support, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 73, 117 (2007).
382 ARIZ. JUDICIAL NOMINATING COMM'Ns, APPLICATION FOR NOMINATION TO JUDICIAL
OFFICE, available at http://www.supreme.state.az.us/jnc/view-applications.htm.
383 Id.; see also JUDICIAL QUALIFICATIONS COMM'N OF S.D., PERSONAL DATA
QUESTIONNAIRE-JUDGE (revised June 2oo8), available at http://www.sdjudicial.com/uploads/
downloads/JQC/JQCjudge%2oappl.pdf#search= (personal data questionnaire consisting of
eight pages with no questions concerning impartiality); OKLA. JUDICIAL NOMINATING COMM'N,
APPLICATION FOR OKLAHOMA JUDICIAL VACANCY I I, available at http://www.oscn.net/Sites/
JudicialNominatingCommission/documents/application%2oform.pdf (including no questions
regarding impartiality other than inquiring if the applicant belongs to any organization that re-
stricts membership on the basis of sex, race, color, religion, or national origin); IDAHO JUDICIAL
COUNCIL, APPLICATION FOR APPOINTMENT TO JUDICIAL OFFICE (revised Mar. 2007), available
at http://www.judicialcouncil.idaho.gov/Application.pdf (same); DC FED. LAW ENFORCEMENT
NOMINATING COMM'N, JUDICIAL CANDIDATE QUESTIONNAIRE 23, availableat http://www.norton.
house.gov/images/stories/us-district-court-judge-questionnaire.pdf (same).
384 The Montgomery County, Tennessee, Human Resources Department's applica-
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reminds candidates of the importance of impartiality and encourages those
possessing the trait to apply.3"s At a minimum, applications for judicial
vacancies should include a yes-or-no question asking whether the candidate
will comply with the judicial code's mandate that judges perform all duties
fairly and impartially.3 6 The Hawaii Judicial Selection Commission takes
this approach and includes the following question in its application:
Canon 2 of the Hawai'i Revised Code of Judicial Conduct states that a judge
should perform the duties of judicial office impartially, competently, and
diligently. Is there any reason why you could not meet the requirements
of Canon 2 and its rules and commentary if you are appointed to judicial
office? 87
As stated by Professor Pimentel, "if we want to preserve judicial
independence--or, more precisely, a system that affords due process to all
parties, impartially andaccordingto law-our judicial screening and selection
criteria should weight these characteristics heavily.""8 And the public
should know that these selection factors are heavily weighed.
b. Emphasizing Impartiality in Judicial Elections
Infusing the primacy of impartiality into the judicial nomination
commission process can be readily accomplished by highlighting the
concept in the selection criteria, judicial application form, and interview
process. While these uncomplicated, cost-free steps will not insure the
selection of persons possessing the impartiality gene, they will alert
commission members, judicial applicants, and the public of the importance
the government places on fairness and impartiality.
Advancing the cause of judicial impartiality in the election process is
much more difficult. Thousands of voters, rather than a small number of
commission members, must be convinced of the overriding importance
of impartiality. Moreover, the electorate must withstand a constant
tion for judicial office includes questions focusing on the applicant's ability to administer
justice impartially. MONTGOMERY CNTY. TENN. HUMAN RESOURCEs DEP'T, APPLICATION FOR
NOMINATION TO JUDICIAL OFFICE 8, available at http://www.montgomerycountytn.org/county/
employment/JudicialApplication.pdf (requesting 150 word essays on the applicant's approach
to addressing issues of bias in the judicial system and the applicant's activities demonstrating
a commitment to equal justice under the law).
385 See COMM'N ON STATE JUDICIAL SELECTION STANDARDs, AM. BAR Ass'N, supra note 377,
at 8 ("[Dlisclosure of selection criteria encourages qualified candidates to seek judicial office
by informing them of the qualities sought in a qualified judge.").
386 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.2 (2oo7) ("A judge shall uphold and apply
the law, and shall perform all duties of judicial office fairly and impartially.").
387 HAW. JUDICIAL SELECTION COMM'N, APPLICATION FOR JUDICIAL OFFICE 19, available at
http://www.courts.state.hi.us/docs/form/jsc/JSPo84.pdf.
388 Pimentel, supra note 279, at 24 (citation omitted).
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bombardment of the counter-impartiality message broadcast by single-issue,
highly partisan, interest groups. These groups define the best candidate
not in terms of dedication to the rule of law, but in terms of the judicial
candidate's personal opinion concerning abortion, guns, gay marriage, tort
reform, or other controversial political or social issue. Nevertheless, simple
strategies are available to increase the emphasis on judicial impartiality
during the election process.
(1) Candidate Questionnaires and Interviews
The importance of impartiality can be emphasized in the candidate
questionnaires and interviews utilized by bar associations, civic organizations,
and the media. The League of Women Voters, for example, suggests that its
local chapters ask individuals seeking a seat on the bench to define judicial
independence and discuss its importance to the legal system.389 The
League also requests that candidates explain their approach to handling a
conflict between personal beliefs and the law.39 Placing a similar emphasis
on impartiality, the Philadelphia Inquirer based its recent endorsement
of incumbent judges, in part, on their ability to document instances in
which they acted to preserve judicial independence.3 9 1 The Inquirer asked
non-incumbent office-seekers, "how do you plan to remain independent
if elected to the bench?"392 All judicial candidates in Pennsylvania were
invited to describe means by which they planned to keep their current or
future courtrooms bias-free. 93 More common, however, is the unhelpful,
boiler-plate inquiry offered by civic groups and newspapers that merely
requests a summary of the judicial candidate's experience and education
and an essay explaining why the candidate should be elected.94
Promoting the fundamental value of fairness requires that civic groups,
bar associations, and the press beseech candidates to define impartiality and
describe specific measures that they will employ to maintain and enhance
that judicial quality.
389 LEAGUEOFWOMENVOTERS,SAFEGUARDINGUSDEMOCRACY:PROMOTINGANINDEPENDENT
JUDICIARY I (2007-2009), available at http://www.lwv.org/AM/Femplate.cfm?Section=Home&
section=Miscellaneous&template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentFilelD=2290.
390 Id.









Although endorsed by the ABA, 3  the California Commission for
Impartial Courts, 3 and several respected judges and commentators," the
idea of pre-judicial education has been slow to gain a foothold. A few states
require candidates for elected judicial office to complete a short course in
ethical campaign practices. 398 On a more comprehensive scale, the Ohio
legislature is considering a "judicial candidate qualification program." "
If enacted, the proposal would mandate that judicial candidates attend a
forty-hour course covering civil and criminal procedure, rules of evidence,
constitutional lawjudicial demeanor, and other subjects deemed appropriate
by the Supreme Court of Ohio.'
Pre-judicial education has the potential to serve as an important tool in
enhancing judicial impartiality." To do so, however, the curriculum cannot
be limited to the "nuts and bolts" of substantive and procedural law or
restricted to hints on how to avoid bad appearances. A significant portion of
any pre-bench program must provide a forum for exploring the theoretical
underpinnings of the impartial magistrate, the cognitive illusions discussed
previously," and the everyday situations successful candidates will face
that test their ability to maintain courtroom neutrality. Training of this
type may cause some of the more impartiality-challenged aspirants to see
the light and self-select out of the process." The remaining candidates
will have a new, or at least enhanced, notion of the meaning of judicial
impartiality, in theory and in practice. While beneficial regardless of the
method of judicial selection, pre-judicial education is especially valuable
395 Am. BAR Ass'N HOUSE OF DELEGATES, RESOLUTION No. I13, at 1, 9-10 (2009), avail-
able at http://www.abanet.org/judind/pdf/HOD%2oResolution%20%2oReport %zoIJE%zo
Adopted 13.pdf (urging states to adopt pre-selection judicial education programs).
396 JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., COMMISSION FOR IMPARTIAL COURTS: FINAL REPORT 73-74
(2oog), available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/jc/tflists/documents/cicfinalreport.pdf.
397 See, e.g., Marc T. Amy, Judiciary School: A Proposal for a Pre-Judicial LL.M. Degree, 52
J. LEGAL EDUC. 130, 130 (2002); Keith R. Fisher, Education for Judicial Aspirants, 43 AKRON
L. REV. 163, 201 (20to); Ellen F. Rosenblum, Judicial Ethics for All:An Expansive Approach to
JudicialEthics Education, 28 JUST. Sys. J. 394,396 (2007).
398 See, e.g., OHIO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 4.2(A)(4) (2009) (requiring two hours of
instruction on campaign practices, finance, and ethics); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, §
Ioo.5(A)(4)(f) (2010) (permitting candidates to complete an education program in person, by
videotape, or over the Internet).
399 H.B. 173, 127th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2007-o8).
400 Id.
401 Fisher, supra note 397, at 201. Fisher argues that one purpose of pre-judicial educa-
tion is to populate the bench with men and women "more consciously committed to fulfilling
the ideals of the fair and impartial administration of justice for all." Id.
402 See id. at 196 (suggesting that pre-judicial education include sensitivity training
regarding stereotyping and subconscious bias).
403 See Rosenblum, supra note 397, at 395-
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in states with an elected judiciary. In those jurisdictions, there may be no
judicial screening process, candidates may be non-lawyers,' and some
candidates will have absolutely no idea what it means to be a judge.40
(3) The Responsibility of Judicial Candidates to Promote Impartiality
The job of instilling an appreciation and respect for judicial impartiality
during a campaign lies in large part with the judicial candidates themselves.
And most candidates do stress their commitment to fairness and dedication
to the rule of law. Too often, however, judicial aspirants stray from the
impartiality message in order to satisfy, or at least avoid displeasing, interest
groups with a large membership, a large pocketbook, or both.
The 2007 Code encourages judicial candidates to reinforce the
importance of the neutral magistrate during campaign appearances.
Comment fifteen to Rule 4.1 of the Code advises that judicial candidates,
when discussing disputed or controversial legal or political issues like
abortion or the death penalty, "should also give assurances that they will
keep an open mind and will carry out their adjudicative duties faithfully
and impartially if elected."' Comment thirteen to Rule 4.1 suggests that
a candidate "should acknowledge the overarching judicial obligation to
apply and uphold the law, without regard to his or her personal views."47
404 Approximately thirty-three states allow non-attorney judges to preside in some cas-
es. SPECIAL COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF THE N.Y. STATE COURTS, JUSTICE MOST LOCAL: THE
FUTURE OF TOWN AND VILLAGE COURTS IN NEW YORK STATE 30 (2008), available at http://www.
nyslocalgov.org/pdf/Justice_Most_Local.pdf.
405 The Special Commission on the Future of New York State Courts noted some of the
outrageous behavior of the Justices of the Town and Village Courts, seventy-percent of whom
are non-lawyers:
[Jiustices jailed defendants absent a guilty plea or trial; evicted litigants
without first holding a proper proceeding; refused to appoint lawyers for
criminal defendants who were entitled to representation; jailed litigants
for failing to pay a fine; adjudicated cases where their own family
members were involved; presided over proceedings while intoxicated;
freed crime suspects as favors to friends; fixed the outcome of cases;
communicated with witnesses ex parte . . . and admitted unfamiliarity
with the most basic of legal principles. . .. [Justices were found to
have made blatantly racist or other disparaging statements. Moreover,
there were several alarming accounts of justices who-in the context
of presiding over domestic violence matters-made statements to the
effect that the victim probably deserved the abusive treatment or had
exaggerated its severity.
Id. at 39; see also Geoffrey P. Miller, Bad Judges, 83 Tx. L. REV. 431,477 (2004) (suggesting that
judicial education programs are "particularly useful" for lower-level judges who sometimes
are not lawyers).
4o6 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 4.1 cmt. 15 (2007) (emphasis added).
407 Id. R. 4.1 cmt. 13 (emphasis added).
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Regrettably, the term "should" renders these provisions aspirational
guides, not enforceable rules." As such, they can be ignored without fear
of discipline. Making both comments mandatory by replacing the word
"should" with the word "must" would add teeth to the admonishments
and insure impartiality a place in campaign rhetoric.40
Judicial candidates who fail to temper statements of personal belief on
hot-button issues with assurances that they will follow the law should be
called out by bar associations, judicial watchdog groups, other candidates,
and the press. Failing to mention the duty of impartiality when discussing
controversial social or political issues violates comments thirteen and
fifteen, regardless of whether the provisions are mandatory or hortatory. A
judge's duty is not limited to compliance with the disciplinary rules found
in a judicial code. Judges also have an explicit duty of "seeking to achieve"
even the purely "aspirational goals" of the Code.4 10 Thus, failure to comply
with the comments reflects adversely on the willingness of an individual
to abide by ethical standards-a fact that the voting public has a right to
know.
c. Testing Judicial Candidates for Impartiality
Is there a test available to weed out biased individuals from the
merit and elective selection processes? The most likely candidate is the
extremely popular4ii but controversial412 series of Implicit Association Tests
created by Brian Nosek, Mahzarin Banaji, and Tony Greenwald.4 "' These
computerized tests, designed to identify gender, racial, ethnic, age, religious,
and other subconscious biases, have been taken by 4.5 million individuals
4o8 Use of the term "should" in a Rule or comment of the 2007 Code renders the provi-
sion permissive, not mandatory. Id. scope 2 & 3. The term "must" renders a Rule binding and
enforceable. Id. scope 3.
409 It is beyond the scope of this Article to examine the extent to which a code of judicial
conduct may constitutionally require candidates for judicial office to make particular state-
ments or refrain from making certain statements during a political campaign. See Republican
Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 765-68 (2002). It is worth noting, however, that the
2007 Code provides that a judicial candidate "must" instruct his or her campaign committee
to accept only lawful, reasonable, and appropriate contributions. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT R. 4.4 cmt. 3 (2007). This provision places an affirmative and enforceable duty on a
judge to give the instruction to committee members. See id. scope 3.
410 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT scope 4 (2007).
4"I Hart Blanton et al., Strong Claims and Weak Evidence: Reassessing the Predictive Validity
of the IAT, 94 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 567, 567 (2009) (noting the popularity of the Implicit
Association Tests).
412 Ingrid E. Castro, Implicit Racism, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RACE AND RAcisM 156, 157
(John Hartwell Moore ed., 2oo8) ("Project Implicit is a large and somewhat controversial
psychological study .... ").
413 Project Implicit Team, PROJECT IMPLICIT, http://projectimplicit.net/people.php (last
visited Sept. 12, 20I0).
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worldwide. 4 14 The object of each test is to assess the "strength of temporal
associations" between a category of people and "positively or negatively
evaluative terms."41 5 For example, the "Race" Implicit Association Test
asks subjects to strike a certain computer key with their left hand when
a black face or a "negative" word (e.g., evil, war) appears on the computer
screen and to strike a different key with their right hand when a white face
or positive word (e.g., love, hope) is shown. 4 16 In the second part of the test,
the right hand key is struck for positive words and black faces and the left
hand key is struck for negative words and white faces. 417 The time it takes
for a subject to match positive and negative words with white and black
faces is measured. 4 18 Seventy-five to eighty percent of the Asian and white
test-takers require less time to match positive words with white faces than
with black faces. 419 As a result, some researchers conclude that most Asians
and whites have an implicit preference for Caucasians and an implicit bias
against African-Americans. 42 0
Should Implicit Association Tests be given to judicial candidates as a
screening device? The consensus is that the tests are inappropriate for use
in determining the fitness of an individual to serve as a judge.421 Three
primary considerations support this conclusion. First, and most telling, the
test creators argue against the use of their assessment device as a selection
tool and state that they will testify against anyone who tries to use an Implicit
Association Test for that purpose. 422 Second, factors other than implicit bias
could account for the variation in reaction times on the tests. Sympathy for
414 See General Information, PROJECT IMPLICIT, http://projectimplicit.net/generalinfo.php
(last visited Sept. 12, 2010).
415 John Duckitt, Prejudice, in 5 NEw DICTIONARY OF 'THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 1890, 1893
(Maryanne Cline Horowitz ed., 2005).
416 See Implicit Association Test (Race), ONLINE PSYCHOLOGY LABORATORY, http://opl.apa.
org/Experiments/About/AboutlATRace.aspx (last visited Sept. 10, zolo).
417 Id.
48 Id.
419 See General Information, supra note 414.
420 Id. Additionally, an age-related Implicit Association Test demonstrates that over
eighty percent of respondents display "implicit negativity toward the elderly compared to
the young." Id.
421 Rachlinski et al., supra note 331, at 1227-28 ("We do not suggest that people who
display strong white preferences on the IAT should be barred from serving as judges, nor do
we even support using the IAT as a measure of qualification to serve on the bench. The direct
link between IAT score and decisionmaking is far too tenuous for such a radical recommenda-
tion." (citation omitted)).
422 Shankar Vedantam, See No Bias, WASH. PosT, Jan. 23, 2005, at Wi 2 ("The problem,
Banaji says, is that all those uses, [employment screening and proving discrimination], assume
that someone who shows bias on the test will always act in a biased manner. Because this isn't
true, Banaji and her colleagues argue against the use of the IAT as a selection tool or a means
to prove discrimination. Banaji says she and her colleagues will testify in court against any at-
tempt to use the test to identify biased individuals.").
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(or less familiarity with) the minority group, compassion or guilt regarding
the plight of the disadvantaged, knowledge of cultural stereotypes, test
anxiety, and the test-taker's cognitive and physical agility might explain
differing reaction times. 42 3 Third, evidence that Implicit Association Tests
accurately predict discriminatory behavior is "surprisingly weak." 42 4
The inappropriateness of the Implicit Association Tests as a screening
device does not diminish the fact that the tests are a powerful and
personalized starting point in educating judges about implicit bias. Once
judges accept that cognitive impairments interfere with decision-making,
steps can be taken to "both facilitate the reduction of unconscious biases and
encourage judges to use their abilities to compensate for those biases."425
2. JudicialPerformanceEvaluations.-Lawyers and bar associations assessed
judicial performance long before states began their own evaluation
programs.426 Whether privately or governmentally sponsored, the primary
purpose of performance evaluations is to allow judges to correct their faults
and improve overall performance.427 This is accomplished by providing
423 Gregory Mitchell & Philip E. Tetlock, Antidiscrimination Law and the Perils of
Mindreading, 67 OHIo ST. L.J. 1023, o81-84 (2oo6).
424 Blanton, supra note 411, at 568 ("[W]e closely scrutinize claims that the race IAT
predicts discriminatory behavior-and discover that the evidence is surprisingly weak."); see
also Ralph Richard Banks & Richard Thompson Ford, (How) Does Unconscious Bias Matter?:
Law, Politics, and Racial Inequality, 58 EMORY L.J. 1053, xxxx n.18o (2009) ("Many researchers
have attempted, during the past decade, to establish a link between IAT scores and discrimi-
natory behavior, but thus far have not achieved the success for which they hoped."); Gregory
Mitchell & Philip E. Tetlock, Facts Do Matter: A Reply to Bagenstos, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 737,
747-48 (2009); Mitchell & Tetlock, supra note 423, at 1094. But see Jerry Kang et al., Are Ideal
Litigators WhiteMeasuring the Myth of Colorblindness, 7 J. EM PI RICAL LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming
Dec. 2010) (suggesting the predictive validity of Implicit Association Tests).
425 Rachlinski et al., supra note 331, at 1226.
426 In 1855, David Davis was endorsed by the lawyers of the Eighth Judicial Circuit for
retention as a circuit judge. See KING, supra note 3, at 91 ("In 1855, in response to the almost
unanimous demand of the bar, the people re-elected Davis as circuit judge for a six-year
term."). This endorsement took the form of a letter from twenty-four lawyers asking Davis for
his "assent to an announcement of [Davis] as a candidate for re-election to the office of Judge
of the Circuit Court." Letter from Thomas M. Moffett, supra note 51. Such letters provided a
common device for "drafting" judicial candidates in Illinois in the mid-nineteenth century. See
EDWARD M. MARTIN, THE ROLE OF THE BAR IN ELECTING THE BENCH IN CHICAGO 33-34(1936).
The Chicago Bar Association began using bar polls to evaluate judicial candidates in 1887. Id.
at oo-ol; see also Penny J. White, Judging Judges: Securing Judicial Independence by Use of Judicial
Performance Evaluations, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1053, 1o64 (2ooz) ("Uludicial evaluation has
been a subject of debate since the late I8oos.").
427 ILL. Sup. CT. R. 58(c) (2010) (establishing performance evaluations for the purpose
of "achieving excellence in the performance of individual judges and the improvement of
the judiciary as a whole"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-2-104(5)(b) (LexisNexis 2oo8 & Supp.
2009) (defining the goal of the performance evaluation program to be improvement in the
performance of individual judges); David C. Brody, Judicial Performance Evaluations by State
Governments: Informing the Public While Avoiding the Pitfalls, 21 JUST. Sys. J. 333, 334 (2000)
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individual judges with feedback and by identifying problem areas in
need of judicial training.28 Additionally, performance evaluations provide
information for voters in jurisdictions with retention elections.429
Reinforcing impartiality during every step of the judicial evaluation
process helps advance the cause of actual impartiality in several related
ways. First, it brands and solidifies the concept as an accepted social norm
among lawyers, judges, and the public. Second, it increases the likelihood
that judges exhibiting the quality will be retained in office while those
lacking the quality will not. Third, highlighting impartiality in states with
retention elections refocuses the campaign debate on the rule of law rather
than the judge's personal beliefs or the popularity of any single decision
by the judge.430 But as in the case of judicial nomination commissions, 1'
some states have done a better job than others in declaring that impartiality
counts in evaluating judicial performance.
The Judicial Performance Standards established by the Missouri Bar
Association effectively reinforce the importance of impartiality in the
evaluation process. The first performance measure asks whether the
judge "[a]dministers justice impartially and uniformly." 432 In making
this determination, the Missouri Bar Evaluation Committee considers
four factors, namely, whether the judge (1) "[tlreats people equally,
regardless of race, gender, ethnicity, economic status, or any other factor";
(2) "[dlisplays fairness and impartiality toward each side of the case";
(3) "[ils not affected by partisan considerations"; and (4) "[wleighs all
("[Mlore than twenty states have developed [judicial performance evaluation] programs of
their own in an effort to improve the performance of judges (rather than inform the pub-
lic).").
428 ARiz. R. PROC. JUD. PERF. REV. R. 2(g)(2) (directing the state Judicial Performance
Review Commission to identify educational needs and to work with the Committee on
Judicial Education and Training to design courses to meet those needs).
429 INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL Sys., SHARED EXPECTATIONS: JUDICIAL
ACCoUNTABILITY IN CONTEXT 3 (Zoo6). The authors assert that judicial performance evalua-
tion "provides a valuable source of information to voters in states where judges must face an
election to remain in office." Id. SeeCoLO. REV. STAT. § 13-5.5-101(i) (2010) (declaring judicial
self-improvement and voter information as the dual purpose of the Colorado Commission on
Judicial Performance).
43o Rebecca Love Kourlis & Jordan M. Singer, Using Judicial Performance Evaluations
to Promote Judicial Accountability, 90 JUDICATURE 200, 202-03 (2007) (suggesting that judicial
performance evaluations influence the electorate to base its decision on a candidate's im-
partiality, independence, knowledge, fairness, and efficiency rather than personal opinions
on "hot-button" issues); INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYs., supra note 429,
at 4 (stating that judicial performance evaluations can refocus the debate on the fairness and
knowledge of the judge rather than the judge's decision in a particular case).
431 See supra notes 374-381 and accompanying text (discussing the failure of many judi-
cial nominating commissions to identify impartiality as a selection criterion).
432 Judicial Performance Standards, Mo. BAR Ass'N, http://www.mobar.org/data/judgesio/
standards.htm (last visited Oct. iI, 2010).
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evidence fairly and impartially."4" These criteria make it impossible
for members of the evaluation committee to overlook the importance of
impartiality. The questionnaire sent to lawyers practicing before the judge
incorporates these same factors. 4 3 Thus, each lawyer completing the
survey is reminded of the core value of impartiality. Equally important,
the questionnaire alerts judges that fairness weighs heavily in whether
they will receive a recommended rating.435 Further branding impartiality
as a cultural norm, the criteria appear prominently on the Missouri Bar's
website, thereby apprising the public that Missouri lawyers consider
fairness and impartiality to be the trademark of a judge.43 6
The questionnaire sent to jurors as part of Alaska's evaluation process
gets to the heart of the matter by simply and directly asking, "[wias the
judge fair and impartial to all sides in the case?"43  Kansas surveys non-
attorneys, including jurors, police, court and probation staff, social service
caseworkers, and others regarding a judge's performance. 438 The section
of the Kansas non-attorney survey entitled "Impartiality" asks four direct
questions regarding the judge's fairness: whether the judge gives litigants
"a fair opportunity to be heard," "prejudge[s] . . . cases," "[piresents a
neutral presence on the bench," and "[t]reats all people fairly regardless of
who they are."4 39
Other states fail to stress impartiality as a judicial performance standard.
For example, the Utah legislature directs that the following factors be
considered during the evaluation of sittingjudges: "integrity," "knowledge,"
"understanding of the law," "ability to communicate," "punctuality,"
"preparation," "attentiveness," "dignity," "control over proceedings," and
"skills as a manager."44o Certainly these are important judicial traits, and it
may be that the legislature intended that integrity include impartiality, but
that is no reason to omit "impartiality" from the top ten list of evaluation
criteria. Exhibiting the same deficiency, Hawaii Supreme Court Rule 19.4
433 Id.
434 Judging the Judges-2oio, Mo. BAR Ass'N, http://www.mobar.org/data/judgesio/index.
htm (last visited Oct. II, 2010).
435 The Missouri Bar Association also sends a questionnaire to jurors as part of the evalu-
ation process. The first question on the juror survey asks, "[d]id the judge treat people equally
regardless of race, gender, ethnicity, economic status, or any other factor?" Id. The second
question asks, "[did the judge appear to be free from bias?" Id.
436 See Judicial Performance Standards, supra note 430.
437 Memorandum from Alaska Jud. Council Staff to Jud. Council 15 (Feb. 7,2oo8), avail-
able at http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/retention/retento8/jrsrvo8.pdf.
438 General Information, KAN. COMM'N ON JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE, http://kansasjudicial
performance.org/index.cfm?Page=Generallnformation (last visited Oct. I I, 2010).
439 Survey of Non-Attorneys About TialJudges, KAN. COMM'N ON JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE,
http://www.kansasjudicialperformance.org/documents/Survey-Non-Attorneys-About-Trial-
Judges.pdf (last updated May 1, 2009).
44o UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-2-i04(5)(d) (LexisNexis Supp. 2009).
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sets out judicial performance considerations to include: "(a) [legal ability;
(b) [j]udicial management skills; (c) [clomportment; and (d) [any other
criteria established by the [evaluation] committee and approved by the
supreme court.""'
As demonstrated in Missouri, Alaska, and Kansas, judicial performance
evaluations offer a ready-made method for promoting actual impartiality.
CoNcLusIoN
In 1789, Congress mandated that every federal judge take the following
oath:
I, - do solemnly swear or affirm, that I will administer justice
without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich,
and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the
duties incumbent upon me as _ , according to the best of my abilities
and understanding, agreeably to the constitution, and laws of the United
States. So help me God."2
It is no mistake that the one-sentence oath contains three references
to judicial impartiality. The repetitive statements about administering
justice impartially and without respect to persons or wealth were included
because the drafters knew that the legitimacy of any state-imposed dispute
resolution system rests upon the promise of a neutral magistrate. David
Davis and his contemporaries recited this oath and were held to its standard
of actual impartiality.
Today, federal judges declaim the same oath." 3 But the emphasis of
judicial codes on appearances has altered the oath's meaning. Judicial
officers now, in effect, pledge to (1) administer justice without respect to
persons, (2) appear to administer justice without respect to persons, (3) do
justice to the rich and poor alike, (4) appear to do justice to the rich and poor,
(5) discharge the duties of office faithfully and impartially, and (6) appear
to discharge the duties of office faithfully and impartially. Placing reality
and perception on the same plane devalues impartiality and overvalues
appearances. Judicial conduct rules, judicial discipline, judicial education,
441 HAW. Sup. CT. R. 19-4. The questionnaire used to evaluate Hawaii family court judges
in 2oo8 included inquiries regarding the judge's bias and inquiries regarding the evenhanded
treatment of attorneys and litigants under the heading, "comportment." HAw. STATE JUDICIARY,
JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE PROGRAM: 2oo8 REPORT 49 (2oo8), available at http://www.courts.
state.hi.us/docs/jud/Jud-performo8.PDE Similar survey questions relating to the impartial-
ity of Hawaii Appellate Judges were presented under a "Fairness and Impartiality" heading.
Id. at 5 tbl.I.
442 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 8, I Stat. 73, 76.
443 The oath has undergone two minor, non-substantive changes since Davis's time.
The phrase, "or affirm," has been placed within parentheses and the word "under" has been
substituted for the phrase, "agreeable to." 28 U.S.C. § 453 (2oo6).
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and judicial advisory opinions are currently configured around perception,
not fact. Virtual friends mandate judicial disqualification when real friends
do not.' But as the founders recognized, it is the cultural norm of actual
impartiality that legitimizes and supports a judicial system." Appearances
cannot perform the same function."6 Once impartiality in fact is devalued
sufficiently to become a secondary consideration, it will be replaced by a
new cultural norm. The most likely candidate for the successor measure
of a judge's worth is the judge's willingness to commit to partisan political
or social positions, and then to deliver decisions accordingly. In that event,
the ability and willingness of a tribunal to impartially discharge the judicial
function, or administer justice without respect to persons or wealth, is of
absolutely no value.
David Davis's performance as a judge is just one example of what takes
place in courtrooms throughout the country everyday: judges setting aside
personal and partisan allegiances to render fair decisions dictated by facts
and law. Actual impartiality, not appearances, is the goal of the American
judicial system. It is time to confirm that fact and take affirmative steps to
reestablish actual impartiality as the fundamental value of judicial ethics.
444 See supra notes 231-239 and accompanying text.
445 See Rachlinski et al., supra note 331, at 1223 ("[Ilmpartiality is a prominent element
in almost every widely accepted definition of the judicial role." (citation omitted)). Not only
do judicial systems depend on an absence of partiality, but "[allmost every important theory
of morality includes the idea of impartiality." JAMES RACHELS, THE ELEMENTS OF MORAL
PHILOSOPHY 9 (1986).
446 See Ryan L. Souders, Note, A Gorilla at the Dinner Table: Partisan Judicial Elections in
the United States, 25 REV. LITIG. 529, 539 (2oo6) ("The appearance of impartiality, therefore, is
a necessary but insufficient element to achieving legitimacy and a neutral triadic dispute reso-
lution system. The second and preferred path to legitimacy, however, yields the appearance
of impartiality through the actual existence of impartiality.").
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